




ON FREE-RIDERS AND SOVEREIGN DEFAULT: THE RISE OF NON-TRADITIONAL 








A thesis submitted to Johns Hopkins University in conformity with the requirements for  
 
















© 2021 Christopher Dielmann 





Abstract: Since the onset of the Global Financial Crisis in 2007, new cross-border 
lending to emerging and developing countries has been dominated by ‘non-traditional’ 
lenders. As a result, defaulting countries at present typically owe the plurality of their 
debt to these newly dominant lenders. These new lenders - often Chinese institutions - 
are not members of the Paris Club and primarily lend to low-income countries. This 
development has represented a serious challenge to the pre-existing Paris Club 
framework for dealing with sovereign debt defaults. Moreover, some observers have 
claimed that the terms demanded by these new lenders have been unusually 
unfavorable to low-income borrowers, fueling concerns about the use of ‘debt-trap 
diplomacy’. Based upon empirical analysis of newly-compiled comprehensive data, this 
thesis finds that while certain non-traditional bilateral creditors do engage in problematic 
lending practices - including contract provisions that forbid the use of the Paris Club or 
comparability of treatment - there currently exists little evidence to suggest that recent 
increases in Chinese lending have led to higher observed incidence of debt distress. 
Furthermore, there exists mixed evidence on whether Paris Club treatment results in 
improved macroeconomic outcomes for debtor countries. Notably, Paris Club debt 
restructuring does not appear to reduce the incidence of serial defaults when compared 
to sovereign debtors that do not receive such treatment. 
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I. Introduction: China’s Role in Sovereign Lending and Debt-Trap 
Diplomacy?  
When news broke in December 2017 that China had seized control of Sri 
Lanka’s Hambantota Port, participants ranging from both public and private credit 
markets to senior government officials suddenly wondered if the process of asset 
seizures represented the new-normal in how defaulting Chinese debt claims would be 
settled in the future (Ondaatjie and Sirimanne 2019; Pence 2018; Schultz 2017). 
While the news of the Hambantota Port seizure made global headlines, many 
that had been following Chinese sovereign lending were already quite familiar with the 
issue. In fact, Sri Lanka’s President Maithripala Sirisena had spent much of the previous 
year running on a platform centered on accusing the previous Rajapaksa government of 
engaging in opaque dealings with Chinese officials to fund pet projects (Sridharan 
2018). The most notable of these was the Hambantota Port project; however, this was 
only one of multiple big-ticket projects that Rajapaksa was able to place in his home 
district of Hambantota. These also included a 35,000-person cricket stadium and a new 
international airport that has been dubbed the ‘world’s emptiest’ (Hillman 2018). What 
made these projects so confounding to many critics was that they were backed by a 
seemingly endless amount of Chinese funding, despite numerous feasibility studies 
suggesting that none of them would ever be profitable (ibid).  
After being unable to meet its payment obligations in 2017, the Sirisena 
government concluded that its best remaining option was to cede control over the 
Hambantota Port and 15,000 acres of surrounding land to a Chinese state owned 
 
2 
enterprise in order to abrogate its debt liabilities.1 Despite the work of scholars such as 
Bräutigam (2019) showing that the case of the Port seizure was an aberration from 
typical Chinese debt renegotiations, that research was not sufficient to prevent immense 
media coverage focused on China’s ‘predatory lending’ practices (Pence 2018) that 
result in asset seizures from poor countries after ‘forcing’ loans upon them, even if 
China is far from the first actor to do so.2 Critics of these practices were quick to cite 
China’s ambitious Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) as a calculated means to use “debt-trap 
diplomacy”3, 4 to further extend its economic grasp over low-income countries (LICs; 
Green 2019), specifically targeting countries lacking the creditworthiness to repay these 
loans (Hurley, Morris, and Portelance 2019).5 
 
The Objective of This Thesis  
 
My objectives are to 1) review the emergence of international concerns about 
Chinese sovereign lending beginning in year 2000, with particular focus on the Paris 
Club as a lead organization in sovereign debt restructuring, and 2) use econometric 
methods to examine whether there is empirical evidence to support the aforementioned 
concerns regarding China. 
 
1 China Merchant Ports Holding Co. Ltd. acquired a 70% controlling stake in the Hambantota Port in 
exchange for the cancellation of US$1.12 bln. of loan claims. 
2 In fact, the most notorious example of large-scale asset seizure is likely the sale of the Suez Canal to 
Great Britain in 1875 after Egypt was unable to meet its payment obligations (Kolb 2011). 
3 Debt-Trap Diplomacy refers to a strategy of foreign policy by gaining either financial, economic, or 
political control over a foreign power through the intentional extension of credit beyond a country’s 
reasonable ability to repay. 
4 For a detailed history of this term see “A Critical Look at Chinese ‘Debt-Trap Diplomacy’: The Rise of a 
Meme” (Bräutigam 2020a). 
5 As found by the Center for Global Development, 33 out of 68 BRI recipient countries were rated below 
investment grade or did not receive a credit rating. See Appendix for a complete list of these countries. 
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Questions surrounding the size and volume of Chinese sovereign lending, lack of 
transparency, and BRI incurred liabilities (especially relating to foreign currency 
exposure) are some of the critical macroeconomic questions of the 21st century and 
warrant further scrutiny and study (Morris 2020). Perhaps the more vital issue, however, 
regarding Chinese lending that has hitherto received little attention in academic or policy 
literature is how international coordination within the context of sovereign restructuring 
might be threatened as a result of these developments. In this thesis, I focus on a 
narrowly defined yet crucial aspect of the greater Chinese lending issue, i.e., whether 
China’s role in bilateral lending and its decision not to accept membership into the Paris 
Club – the primary institutional forum designed around international coordination of 
sovereign defaults – while it was heading the G20 in 2016, is likely to undermine the 
existing framework and process to achieve coordinated outcomes in instances of 
sovereign default (Chin and Dobson 2016).6 I do this by posing two fundamental 
questions: first, whether increases in Chinese lending since 2000 has resulted in higher 
observable incidence of sovereign default and distress, and second, whether or not 
countries that have received debt relief via the Paris Club observed statistically 
improved macroeconomic outcomes.  
While China has, and to a lesser extent still does, engage in problematic lending 
practices that have posed challenges for debtor countries and institutions like the Paris 
 
6 “The [Paris] Club has been conducting extensive outreach to large emerging creditors to familiarize 
them with Paris Club practices. For example, China has participated in several of the Club’s tour d’horizon 
sessions though it has not yet participated in a negotiation on an ad-hoc basis. Other countries such as 
South Africa have participated in negotiations on an ad-hoc basis. An expansion of the Paris Club to 
include, for instance, large emerging creditors is an issue for the Club to address and would likely be 
complementary to staff’s proposal.” See IMF, 2015c. 
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Club, based upon my empirical analysis of these questions, I find that an increase in 
Chinese lending has not led to higher observed incidence of distress episodes for 
borrowing countries. This finding supports earlier findings by Bräutigam that Chinese 
debt-trap diplomacy is, in practice, indeed a myth,7 and that claims of its existence are 
not supported by empirical evidence. Further, the data on macroeconomic outcomes of 
countries that received debt relief via the Paris Club is mixed, at best, and does not 
sufficiently prevent countries from suffering serial defaults. The result of these findings 
is that an enlargement of Paris Club membership, while providing some benefits of 
transparency and cooperation amongst members, is unlikely to serve as a panacea for 
avoiding future sovereign defaults. 
 
The Role of the Paris Club in International Debt Negotiations 
 
The aim of the Paris Club is to provide debt relief by finding “coordinated and 
sustainable solutions to the payment difficulties experienced by debtor countries” (Club 
de Paris n.d.). It does this by harmonizing debtor claims before an international body in 
order to achieve a joint outcome. This aim is beneficial to the debtor and creditor 
countries (and the whole international system more broadly), as it reduces the time and 
costs required to achieve relief and is likely to result in the avoidance of a failed 
negotiation that would likely result in out an outright default.8 As China has chosen not 
to join the Paris Club while continuing to act as an official observer (on ad-hoc status 
 
7 See Bräutigam and Rithmire, 2021. 
8 As noted by Rieffel, “The Paris Club has one truly remarkable characteristic. It is capable of completing 
a rescheduling agreement involving billions of dollars of obligations in eight to twelve hours of 




through the People’s Bank of China (PBoC; see Appendix), it has unique insight into 
global debt negotiations but is not bound by the outcome of said negotiations. As the 
importance and influence of the Paris Club is directly derived from membership across a 
critical mass of lender countries, the sudden rise in importance of a non-member 
country, such as China, has the ability to render the decisions of the Paris Club 
insignificant or ineffective if their members do not represent a critical mass of a debtor 
country’s total liabilities. To put this more succinctly, if China’s claims on a debtor 
country outweigh the total claims by members of the Paris Club, would this undermine 
the relevance of the Paris Club as well as its ability to serve as a ‘port of call’ for debtor 
countries seeking sovereign default resolution? If this is the case, how can existing 
institutions be strengthened to mitigate these new challenges? Alternatively, if these 
new rifts are sufficient to create a divergence of global economic institutions, what 
would the likely policy implications and risks associated with this process be? 
Traditional bilateral sovereign lending programs, from initial design through 
restructuring, are being challenged by the rise of non-traditional sovereign lenders,9 
primarily dominated by China’s growing economic and financial influence. Demand for 
additional capital, particularly from countries that have historically been excluded from 
international capital markets, has created new financing opportunities that have allowed 
Chinese sovereign lending to expanded tremendously in recent years (see Figures 1 & 
 
9 Traditional is defined as sovereign lending from Advanced Markets countries, typically defined by OECD 
membership. By definition, non-traditional lenders represent any sovereigns not included in the earlier list, 
but are predominantly made up of China, India, Saudi Arabia, UAE, and Qatar. 
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2).10 This has led both recipients and proponents of Chinese lending to hail this new 
financing source as a potential catalyst of growth and development. It is important to 
note that, at least in the case of Africa, total debt owed to China on a bilateral basis has 
continued to increase, China’s annual lending has slowed in recent years. As found 
recently by Acker and Bräutigam, “Chinese lending in Africa peaked in 2013, the year 
the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) was launched. The decline since 2013 reflects China’s 
current concerns about debt sustainability” (2021). 
Figure 1. Total Direct Sovereign 
Loans Owed to China 
Figure 2. Total Global Debt Owed to 
China, by Creditor Type, % 
 
 
Note: Figure 1 shows the annual total amount of direct lending, i.e., loans from Chinese creditors to 
borrowing countries, in billions of US$. This amount has grown from near zero in 2000, to c. US$ 393 bln. 
in 2017. Figure 2 shows the total amount of credit owed to China by borrowing countries. This figure 
includes all direct lending shown in Figure 1 as well as publicly traded debt, foreign direct investment, and 
trade credits, measured in percent of global GDP. While this amount has declined from a peak in 2015, 
as of 2018, this amount remains above 6% of global GDP. 
Source: Source: Horn, Reinhart, and Trebesch 2019. 
Notwithstanding the potential benefits of new financing, of which, at least “80 
percent [have] financed economic and social infrastructure projects” (Acker and 
 
10 Between 1998 and 2018, the total debt owed to China increased from less than 1% of global GDP to 















Bräutigam 2021), Chinese lending has introduced new practices that are both opaque 
and not well understood by “other government creditors” (Morris 2020). This lack of 
understanding raises concerns about the effectiveness of international bodies such as 
the International Monetary Fund (IMF), the World Bank (WB), or the Bank for 
International Settlements (BIS), to monitor these flows and to fully evaluate all risks 
involved, ultimately leading to questions about the long-term consequences of these 
new practices. As an example, recent work by the Center for Global Development 
shows that Chinese lending as part of BRI has significantly increased both debt-to-GDP 
and debt-to-China of many low-income countries, raising concerns of changes in debt 
composition and foreign currency exposure (Hurley, Morris, and Portelance 2019). 
While the highly scrutinized ‘seizure’ of the Hambantota Port has received the lion’s 
share of media attention, the outcomes in other bilateral negotiations involving China 
were not known until recently. Nearly all of these negotiations have resulted in deferred 
payments or write-offs (Kratz, Feng, and Wright 2020; see Appendix).11 As noted by 
Acker, Bräutigam, and Huang, “Chinese lenders prefer to address restructuring quietly, 
on a bilateral basis, tailoring programs to each situation” (2020). The frequency of 
modifications suggests that China does appear willing to engage in debt forgiveness or 
reprofilings in cases where recipients are unable to meet their obligations. However, it 
also suggests that many loans were extended to debtors unable to repay and/or on 
terms that were too onerous. A more cynical interpretation might suggest that these 
modifications are merely a subset of the total modifications desired by borrowers, others 
 
11 In fact, it is only recently, through investigative work by SAIS CARI and AidData that the outcomes of 
these negotiations have come to light. 
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might not have been achieved, or borrowers might have been pressured into not 
formally seeking modification. As recently noted by Gelpern et al. it “is entirely possible 
that some of the contract features we identify serve an [express] purpose, or function in 
terrorem, to dissuade the debtor from taking steps adverse to the creditor’s interests” 
(2021). As these negotiations (and even outcomes) are rarely made public, it has led to 
further speculation surrounding the intent of Chinese lending. For an overview of the 
history of sovereign debt restructuring mechanisms, see Box 1. 
 
Mechanism of the Paris Club 
 
The creation of the Paris Club, while not holding the legal authority of a court, 
has sought to create a greater degree of dialogue between both debtor and creditor 
countries that are willing to provide collective debt relief in exchange for the host country 
accepting conditions of macroeconomic reform that are part of a required IMF program 
(Buchheit et al. 2019; Imam 2008). Since its formation, there have been 433 separate 
claims treated from 90 different countries, totaling US$583 billion (Club de Paris n.d.). 
What makes these figures more remarkable is not the size of the claims treated, but 
rather that these outcomes were decided using consensus and information sharing 
amongst member countries (as outlined in the Six Principles of the Paris Club; see 
Appendix). The Paris Club seeks to harmonize debtor claims before an international 
body in order to achieve a joint outcome. This is beneficial to both the debtor and 
creditor countries. In the case of the debtor country, they are able to negotiate with 
multiple creditors simultaneously, thus significantly reducing the time and costs required 
to achieve relief, resulting in increased efficiency of the process. A coordinated 
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negotiation is also likely to increase its efficacy of treatment12 as it would be provided by 
a higher number of creditors than if repeated individual negotiations were to occur, 
benefiting both debtors and creditors. Furthermore, if the intent of relief provided is to 
restore both fiscal and debt sustainability to the host country, it is vital that the treatment 
(and coinciding IMF program) is designed with full information regarding the country’s 
liabilities, which could only be achieved through a coordinated process.13 
 Given the frequency of serial defaults of countries that receive debt relief via the 
Paris Club,14 defined as subsequent default following an initial restructuring, as well as 
the costly and protracted negotiations that are required to achieve debt relief, it would 
be difficult to argue that the existing framework is an ideal solution (Kohlscheen 2007). 
As a result, alternative resolution structures have been put forth, most notably in 2002 
by Anne Krueger,15 who proposed a binding ‘Sovereign Debt Restructuring Mechanism’ 
(SDRM) that would automatically trigger a restructuring if certain conditions were met 
and overseen by the IMF (Krueger 2002). The SDRM failed to gain large scale support 
by private creditors, who objected to being subjugated to the jurisdiction of an 
international body and, ultimately, was not adopted by the IMF’s Executive Board.16 
Renewed attempts at creating a binding mechanism within the structure of the Paris 
Club signify that there exists desire for greater degrees of international cooperation on 
 
12 “Treatment” is the accepted term referring to the debt relief and/or rescheduling of official obligations 
under the Paris Club. 
13 As defined by the ability of the country to finance its internal and external obligations through taxation 
and exports while preventing an explosive path of debt. 
14 A detailed measure of serial defaults is presented throughout Chapter 2. 
15 Then serving as the First Deputy Managing Director of the IMF. 
16 The SDRM proposal was most notably vetoed by the US Treasury, which did not want to be bound to 
providing relief when it might be politically unpopular (Block-Lieb 2015). 
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these issues (Block-Lieb 2015). It is precisely for these reasons that the growing 
importance of non-traditional bilateral creditors that has, so far, resulted in less 
cooperation, is creating concerns about the future of sovereign negotiations and the role 
of the Paris Club. 
 If forums such as the Paris Club do, in fact, provide a better alternative to the 
haphazard and occasionally violent17 outcomes of the past (by increasing creditor and 
debtor coordination and reducing the number of outright defaults), then it will be vital to 
maintain, or even strengthen, these forums in the restructuring process and avoid a 
return to an uncoordinated process across multiple creditor countries, each with 
different intents and degrees of willingness to exercise forgiveness. 
To my knowledge, international financial organizations (IFIs) such as the 
International Monetary Fund and World Bank lack a framework to systematically deal 
with the situations that result from the growing importance and volume of lending 
stemming from non-traditional bilateral lenders, at least within the bounds of the Paris 
Club. While the IMF’s Debt Limits Policy (IMF 2015b ) is designed to require pre-
approval of debt contracting by borrower nations to reduce the likelihood of both hidden 
debts and defaults, this policy only applies to a small subset of countries (IMF 2015b);18 
additionally, it is not designed as an ex-post mechanism where a default has already 
occurred. More recently, the G20’s ‘Common Framework’ (See Box 2), aims to address 
issues of non-traditional bilateral creditors by binding all signatories of the G20 to a 
 
17 See Box 1 on a discussion of ‘gunboat diplomacy’. 
18 The IMF Debt Limits Policy only applies to Poverty Reduction and Growth Trust (PRGT) eligible 




comprehensive framework of debt relief. While the Common Framework does include 
China, the new membership would only extend as far as G20 membership, in addition 
to existing Paris Club members,19 resulting in many creditors still being excluded from 
binding action. Furthermore, due to organizational constraints of the IFIs, it is difficult to 
address these issues directly and openly; for example, in the case of the Paris Club, of 
which China is not a member, the body is free to address its concerns about the rise of 
Chinese lending. In the case of the IMF, however, where China is a member (and one 
of growing importance; IMF 2020b), it is politically challenging to publicly discuss 
matters of importance that are the direct result of the practices of one of its own 
member countries, often leaving debtor countries and commercial creditors in the dark 
regarding China’s role in a restructuring.  
 
Why is Sovereign Lending Outside of the Paris Club a Problem? 
 
The difficulties with having a sovereign lender outside the Paris Club can be 
divided into two main issues. One is the ability of the outside sovereign lender – here 
China – to prevent the Paris Club/IMF from initiating a package of relief for the debtor 
country. The second is the ability of the outside lender to avoid partaking in equal 
burden-sharing following Paris Club treatment.  
The ongoing cases of Zambia and Angola provide two contrasting examples of 
how China as an outside party can complicate a country’s restructuring process even 
 
19 Additional countries included in G20 membership that were not already members of the Paris Club are: 




prior to a country receiving assistance from the IMF and the Paris Club (see Box 3 for a 
detailed discussion on both Zambia and Angola). In the case of Zambia, the IMF has 
deemed that an upfront restructuring must take place before an IMF program can be 
initiated (IMF 2015a). Being unwilling to restructure key loans in Zambia, China has 
effectively blocked both the possibility of an IMF program or Paris Club treatment, 
ultimately resulting in a default by Zambia on its commercial creditors. In Angola, 
China’s willingness to restructure key loans has allowed an IMF lending program. The 
result is that Angola remains current on its commercial creditors and would be eligible 
for future Paris Club treatment if requested. In either case, however, China retains a 
blocking position, allowing it to determine a debtor country’s outcome. 
The second scenario, relating to China’s ability to avoid equal burden-sharing 
across creditors after Paris Club treatment has been obtained needs a closer look and 
is illustrated in the Republic of Congo. 
 
The Example of the Republic of Congo: Avoidance of Burden-Sharing? 
 
The ongoing Paris Club negotiations on the Republic of Congo are likely to serve 
as a critical test case, being the first international debt restructuring that will require an 
IMF program, Paris Club treatment, and also substantial input and agreement from 
China. The presence of China can pose problems both during the restructuring 
negotiations and also following any restructuring by the Paris Club. China as the largest 
creditor will have substantial influence over the negotiations (holding more than 30% of 
the total external public debt and nearly 75% of the official bilateral debt (see Table 1.; 
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IMF 2020a). The immediate concern is a clear coordination issue amongst the relevant 
parties (i.e., Paris Club members vs. non-members) whose interests conflict. 
 
Table 1. Republic of Congo Debt Stock, as of September 2019 
 
  
Note: Table 1 shows the Republic of Congo’s total public and publicly guaranteed debt as a percent of 
GDP, total debt, external debt, and official bilateral debt. The figures of note are shown in bold, those 
being the amount of official bilateral debt owed to China; making up 20% of GDP, 23.2% of total debt, 
32.7% of external debt, and 74.4% of official bilateral debt (compared to only 11.9% owed to all remaining 
Paris Club creditors). 
Source: IMF 2019 Republic of Congo Article IV Staff Report & Author calculations. 
 
China, by far the largest international creditor that is not a Paris Club member 
(generally, as well as specifically with respect to the Republic of Congo), enjoys a 
unique second-mover advantage over both the IFIs and other creditors as it is not 
bound by the solidarity principle required of Paris Club membership that ensures equal 
treatment. The only enforcement mechanism available to the Paris Club is an 
agreement that the debtor country must seek to achieve ‘comparability of treatment’ 
from non-members, i.e., that they attempt to receive terms of relief from non-members 
on terms that are at least as beneficial as those that were provided by the Paris Club 
(Club de Paris n.d.). This situation results in one where China is incentivized to allow 
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the Paris Club to move first and provide the largest possible relief package, effectively 
recapitalizing the country to the point where it would be able to repay China in full (Ross 
2019). 
 
Lack of Transparency in Chinese Sovereign Lending 
 
Unfortunately, this issue is further complicated by the nature of ‘Chinese’ loans, 
which are frequently not made by the government itself but instead through sub-national 
or quasi-sovereign institutions, often at the behest of the Government (Chen 2020). 
While directed lending is not necessarily atypical, what makes the Chinese case unique 
is that nearly all state sponsored loans include non-disclosure agreements, making it 
difficult not only to determine the terms of lending but also to identify who the lender is. 
As noted by SAIS CARI, there “is no ’China Inc.’ when it comes to debt relief. More than 
30 Chinese banks and companies have provided credit to African governments” (Acker, 
Bräutigam, and Huang 2020). The lack of transparency surrounding much of China’s 
overseas lending makes it difficult to measure a country’s total debt burden, as was 
noted by Gulde (2018) with respect to the Republic of Congo, and more generally by 
David Malpass, the current President of the World Bank (2020). Furthermore, recent 
work by Gelpern et al. (2021) finds that Chinese loan contracts that contain 
‘confidentiality clauses’ are actually increasing over time, with all loans after 2015 
showing their inclusion. A lack of transparency is associated with additional issues; as 
recently noted by Mustapha and Olivares-Caminal, “transparency of the debts owed by 
governments and the guarantees they have given is an important issue for the 
international community. The increasing risk of debt distress in many of the world’s 
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poorest countries, coupled with several recent cases of inadequate disclosure that put 
macroeconomic stability at risk, have highlighted the urgent need to make lending to 
governments more open, particularly the terms and conditions. The underlying 
assumption is that more disaggregated information on public debt will enable borrowers 
and lenders to make more responsible borrowing and lending decisions, ultimately 
making a debt crisis less likely. Better quality data can also directly impact sovereign 
ratings and, by extension, lower borrowing costs” (2020). 
 
Creditor Classification and Seniority 
 
Beyond the questions surrounding transparency of lending, the issue of creditor 
classification is a challenge that frequently arises in private restructurings, those being 
with private creditors such as bondholders or loan holders. The issue is determining 
which instruments should or should not be included in the restructuring process. This 
process, known as ringfencing, arises via the discussions between the debtor and the 
creditor committee to determine which, if any, instruments are considered ‘senior’ (e.g., 
recourse loans that are guaranteed through assets generated by a certain project or 
commodity export) and therefore exempt from incurring any write-downs during the 
restructuring process, or which claims should be considered ‘junior’ (e.g., non-recourse 
loans) and therefore eligible to be written down or cancelled. While this process is a 
mainstay of a private restructuring, it is less common when negotiating with official 
creditors where seniority of the claim is based solely on the creditor, rather than the 
instruments themselves. As often cited in the literature on sovereign restructurings, 
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official lenders20 are deemed to be senior to claims by commercial creditors (Cordella 
and Powell 2019; Ari, Corsetti, and Dedola 2018). 
A second category of seniority can stem from a timing issue. If we consider a 
typical default/restructuring scenario for example, it is not uncommon for creditors to 
provide additional financing to a country that is already in payment arrears to other 
creditors (including itself). This financing is generally provided on relatively onerous 
terms to the borrower; however, it is likely necessary in order to continue the successful 
day-to-day operations of the country. Before a creditor is willing to put in this additional 
financing, they generally require that a commitment from the debtor that any new 
financing provided after a certain date, known as the “cut-off” point/date, will be 
excluded from any future restructuring (Edwards 2015). Thus, even claims by the same 
creditor that fall under the same asset categorization could see varying levels of 
seniority based upon the time when the financing was received.  
Given the complexities involved in determining which claims are truly senior 
when comparing across both time and creditor, seniority is often simply assigned based 
upon the ease with which a debtor can, in practice, restructure its claims. This challenge 
was succinctly summarized by Schlegl, Trebesch, and Wright who state: “the typical 
debtor has many creditors. Hence, a debtor that is unable to pay must choose which 
debts to repay and on which debts to default. For individual and corporate borrowers, 
contract and bankruptcy law determines which creditor gets repaid first; creditor 
seniority is a straightforward legal issue. In contrast, for the foreign creditors of a 
 
20 ‘Official lenders’ refers to international organizations, governments and government agencies including 
official monetary institutions (OECD 2001). 
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sovereign government, the lack of an international bankruptcy regime combined with the 
difficulty of enforcing sovereign contracts makes creditor seniority a matter of custom 
and convention. By this convention, the debts of multilateral government lenders such 
as the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and World Bank are senior to the debts of all 
other government creditors, which are in turn senior to the bonds and bank loans owed 
to private sector creditors. Relying on this convention, government creditors have been 
able to lend at relatively low interest rates, even in times of financial distress” (2019). 
         Issues of seniority came to a head throughout the 1980s in what became known 
as the Latin America Debt Crisis (Sims n.d.). Many of the sovereign defaults that 
occurred during this period stemmed from liabilities owed to a small number of 
commercial and investment banks located in the United States and the United Kingdom, 
that had lent using ‘syndicated loans’ (Sachs and Huizinga 1987; Reinhart and Rogoff 
2011). This relatively homogenous creditor base changed dramatically throughout the 
1990s in part due to the restructuring of these liabilities as part of the Brady Plan 
(Peters 1993), that allowed countries to securitize bank loans into tradeable securities 
backed by U.S. Treasury Bonds and, ultimately, leading to the birth of the secondary 
market for emerging market debt. Throughout this period, a substantial literature began 
to emerge to cover the challenges that a restructuring would pose due to diverse and 
heterogenous commercial creditors, including the inclusion of collective action clauses 
or floating rate instruments.21 
 
21 For a detailed discussion on collective action clauses of state-contingent (floating rate) debt 
instruments, see Bredenkamp et al. (2019). 
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         As noted by Panizza, Sturzenegger, and Zettelmeyer (2009), these concerns 
largely proved to be immaterial, and in fact, the duration of the restructuring period 
(being representative of the efficiency of the process) was largely driven by debtor, 
rather than creditor, characteristics. This conclusion, however, misses one important 
aspect, that being that it focuses on private obligations such as bank loans and 
Eurobonds rather than on official sector lending. As sovereign balance sheets have 
grown increasingly varied and complex, frequently featuring “bank and bonded 
debt…large exposure to highly structured and often nonconventional project and trade 
debt, derivatives, repurchase obligations, commercial claims, secured debts, and a 
panoply of contractual obligations…. creditors of sovereign borrowers have themselves 
become more diversified” (Rhodes et al. 2021). This growing complexity of sovereign 
balance sheets includes lending from the official sector. As official sector lending was 
historically found to be relatively homogenous, there exists a lacuna in traditional policy 
literature to address how a growing number of diverse official creditors and instruments 
could result in protracted restructurings.  
 
Seniority and Classification of Chinese Claims 
 
As previously discussed, if the intent of relief is to restore both fiscal and debt 
sustainability to the host country, it is vital to minimize information asymmetries in order 
to achieve a package of debt relief that is sufficient to avoid a subsequent default 
(Guzman and Lombardi 2017; Buchheit et al. 2019). Using directed lending via quasi-
sovereign institutions creates a secondary issue, namely how these liabilities should be 
classified. Government lending is typically classified as “official” lending, rather than 
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“private,” and receives added seniority in claim. This means that if a party defaults, 
official claims are generally settled, or paid out, in full prior to any private claims 
receiving compensation. This issue of classification of Chinese loans is problematic as 
we still lack systematic precedent as to whether loans by quasi-sovereigns should be 
considered official or private. As a result, even in a situation where China were 
voluntarily willing to commit to equal treatment of relief, we would still be unsure of 
which liabilities would be included as part of its official lending, and therefore, which 
liabilities would even be eligible for treatment.22 In fact, as part of Angola’s recent 
negotiations with the Paris Club and G20 regarding the Debt Service Suspension 
Initiative (DSSI), two Chinese creditors that were deemed outside the scope of official 
lending (and thus outs the scope of DSSI), partook in a separate voluntary rescheduling 
of claims (see Box 3).23 
Beyond issues of classification, recent work by Gelpern et al. (2021) has 
uncovered a more troubling trait that is unique to Chinese loans, i.e., that they included 
specific ‘No Paris Club’ clauses. The authors found that every loan within their sample 
contained express wording that “commit the borrower to exclude the debt from any 
multilateral restructuring process, such as the Paris Club of official bilateral creditors, 
and from “comparable treatment” (ibid). Thus, even in cases where all common 
attributes of a loan suggest subordinated status, the ‘No Paris Club’ clause could in 
 
22 In response to the Covid-19 pandemic, China has voluntarily agreed to participate in the G20 Debt 
Service Suspension Initiative (DSSI) moratorium on official sector debt repayments, however, any 
obligation classified as BRI related can be unilaterally exempted by assigning it preferential status, 
creating further uncertainty around issues of classification and intent (Steil and Della Rocca 2020) though 
this has been disputed, see Bräutigam (2020b). 
23 The creditors were China Development Bank (CDB) and the Industrial and Commercial Bank of China 
(ICBC). See IMF 2021a. 
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effect, endue the loan with de facto seniority based upon the debtor’s contractual 
requirement to exclude the claims from a restructuring and subsequent need to seek 
comparability of treatment. Although the recent ratification of the G20’s Common 
Framework, that requires equal burden sharing as well as transparency of claims held 
by signatory states, points towards China’s willingness to seek solutions without the 
need for enforcement of all contractual clauses, this development could, de facto, 
negate China’s ability to enforce prior contractual obligations.  
 
Summary of China’s role in Sovereign Lending 
 
While we are likely still years away from witnessing the outcome of the current 
negotiations between the Paris Club, China, and the Republic of Congo, it is certain to 
shed light onto the potential relevance of the current institutional framework for 
addressing questions of sovereign default, especially with regard to how China is willing 
to rank its claims by seniority. A preemptive restructuring of commercial claims, as was 
the case in Angola (see Box 3) symbolizes a willingness by China to further integrate 
into the existing institutional framework.24 However, if China opts not to restructure its 
claims, the outcome would likely result in a contentious situation like the one we are 
observing in Zambia (ibid). Furthermore, the latter outcome would foreshadow greater 
degrees of policy divergence between China and traditional sovereign lenders.  
 
24 Prior to China’s voluntary participation in the G20’s Debt Service Suspension Initiative (DSSI), China 
had only taken part in one Paris Club restructuring, the 2003 treatment of US$250,000 owed by the 
Kyrgyz Republic (Hurley, Morris, and Portelance 2019). 
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If the latter were to occur, greater questions begin to emerge, including whether 
or not China would create a default resolution mechanism that lies outside of the 
existing framework, i.e., a rival ‘Beijing Club’ (Culverhouse and Dielmann 2019), and 
whether this would undermine the relevance of our current institutional forums. 
Furthermore, what impact would this shift in institutional design have on the future of 
bilateral lending as well as private credit markets more broadly? For example, both 
public and private creditors could simply refrain from lending to countries that are 
deemed to have excessive liabilities to non-Paris Club members on the grounds that 
repayment issues might result in a disorderly restructuring. As found by Mustapha and 
Olivares-Caminal, “non-Paris Club bilateral lenders are rarely part of an established 
creditor coordination and information-sharing group and are not necessarily bound by 
Paris Club terms, principles and standard disclosure requirements. Consequently, their 
behavior is generally considered less predictable should a sovereign borrower face 
financial distress” (2020). Alternatively, if the commercial creditors are indeed willing to 
lend, they would require higher rates of return (via interest payments) from the debtor 
country to compensate them for the additional risk and uncertainty that a disorderly 
default process would entail, as has been shown in the literature.25 Not only would this 
dramatically alter creditor and debtor behavior, but it would also result in longer-term 
development issues for borrowing countries associated with less access to capital 
and/or at higher expense, which was supported by Lang, Mihalyi, and Presbitero. who 
 
25 Work done by the IMF has found that Eurobonds containing collective action clauses (CACs) trade at 




find that “countries eligible for official debt relief experience a larger decline in borrowing 
costs compared to similar, ineligible countries” (2020).  
Up to this point I have looked at the general and potential problems that can be 
caused by the character of loans by China and Chinese quasi-sovereign institutions to 
sovereign nations. In Chapter 2, I will use statistical methods for default prediction in 
order to attempt to determine whether these potential problems have in fact caused 
significant detriment to sovereign debt restructuring involving the Paris Club and other 
entities such as the G20 and the IMF. 
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Box 1. A Brief History of Sovereign Restructuring Mechanisms 
 
“But if they do not acquire the means to repay, what was sold will remain in the 
possession of the buyer until the Year of Jubilee. It will be returned in the Jubilee, and 
they can then go back to their property.” – Leviticus (25:28)26 
 
To understand why the rise of non-traditional bilateral lending is creating new 
challenges, we must briefly consider the history of debt relief. This concept can be 
traced throughout antiquity27 and is a common element of the Old Testament, most 
notably in the Book of Leviticus, which proclaimed that all debts and servitude should 
be canceled in the 7th Sabbath year (every 49 years; Khan 2015). Furthermore, 
Reinhart and Rogoff found that sovereign write-offs and restructurings have been a 
“key part of every major period of financial crisis” (ibid). As common as these events 
have been throughout history, it was not until 1919, with the creation of the Economic 
and Financial Organization (EFO) of the League of Nations that an international body 
was formed to directly address issues of sovereign borrowing (Flores and Decorzant 
2016). This body helped to establish the precedent of coordinated debt relief among 
European nations that were suffering from financial crises during the 1930s (Reinhart 
and Trebesch 2014). It was not until the establishment of the Paris Club28 in 1956, 
however, that a body was created with the express intent of providing a forum for low-
income countries seeking debt relief (Club de Paris n.d.). 
Prior to the creation of these bodies, debt negotiations tended to follow 
unpredictable paths; frequently resulting in outright defaults, repudiation, and in 
certain instances, the use of violence during the era of gunboat diplomacy (Dolzer 




26 Bible Gateway Leviticus 25 :: NIV. 
27 At least 30 general debt cancellations have been counted between the years 2400 and 1400 B.C. 
(Khan 2015) 
28 “The Paris Club is an informal group of official creditors whose role is to find coordinated and 
sustainable solutions to the payment difficulties experienced by debtor countries. As debtor countries 
undertake reforms to stabilize and restore their macroeconomic and financial situation, Paris Club 
creditors provide an appropriate debt treatment. Paris Club creditors provide debt treatments to debtor 
countries in the form of rescheduling, which is debt relief by postponement or, in the case of concessional 
rescheduling, reduction in debt service obligations during a defined period (flow treatment) or as of a set 
date (stock treatment)” (Club de Paris, n.d.). 
sovereign obligations, “Great Britain, Germany, and Italy blockaded Venezuelan ports 
and shelled coastal fortifications, compelling Venezuelan compliance” (Kolb 2011). 
These outcomes, being at extreme ends of the spectrum in terms of benefits for either 
the creditor or the debtor, clearly do not represent efficient outcomes. 
The unpredictable nature of default resolutions is driven by a common element 
of sovereign debt in that there does not exist a bankruptcy court with jurisdiction over 
these matters. This is a unique element of sovereign defaults as all non-sovereign 
claims can be adjudicated via domestic courts or international mediation. For 
example, a defaulting private entity (e.g., person or corporation) in a non-sovereign 
context could seek recourse for their damages via a domestic court. A creditor in a 
sovereign default situation has to rely solely on their persuasive power to convince 
the debtor to repay, the debtor country’s fear of losing its ability to borrow from 
international capital markets in the future (Eaton and Gersovitz 1981), the threat of 
sanctions (Bulow and Rogoff 1989), and, in rare instances, the ability to attach assets 
if they are located outside of the debtor’s jurisdiction, as was the case when a New 
York based hedge fund managed to seize an Argentine naval vessel that had been 
docked in Ghana (Schmall 2012). 
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Box 2. The G20’s Common Framework for Debt Treatments beyond the DSSI 
 
        Recognizing the need for a more comprehensive framework to deal with 
sovereign defaults and restructurings beyond the scope of the Paris Club, in 
November 2020, the G20 ratified the ‘Common Framework for Debt Treatments 
beyond the DSSI’ (Club de Paris 2020b). The new framework expands the list of 
creditor countries to include all members of the G20 in addition to the existing 
members of the Paris Club and would require all members to provide equal burden 
sharing in providing relief to countries that are deemed eligible. The “process will be 
initiated at the request of a debtor country. The need for debt treatment, and the 
restructuring envelope that is required, will be based on an IMF-WBG Debt 
Sustainability Analysis (DSA) and the participating official creditors’ collective 
assessment” (ibid). As of March 2021, Chad, Ethiopia, and Zambia have requested 
debt treatment via the new Common Framework (Golubski and Holtz 2021). 
           However, questions remain as to how the Common Framework will be 
implemented in practice. As the current agreement consists only of a 2-page 
document providing broad guidance, many details of practice will need to be 
established on a case-by-case basis through the “legally non-binding document, 
named “Memorandum of Understanding” (MoU), to be signed by all participating 
creditors and by the debtor country” (Club de Paris 2020b). As Suckling as noted, “at 
present, the G20 has provided very few details on how the Framework will be 
operationalized, aside from specifying the IMF's role in assessing debt sustainability 
and providing program support, with the Fund to retain its preferred creditor status. 
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Participants are expected to undertake the IMF's Debt Sustainability Assessment 
(DSA) and an IMF program involving policy reforms and provision of additional IMF 
financing” (2021). 
           Additional concerns have been raised that, despite the intentions of the G20’s 
Debt Service Suspension Initiative (DSSI), the lack of private sector involvement 
resulted in only 24% of total debt service payments of the 73 eligible countries (see 
Appendix for full list of DSSI eligible countries; World Bank 2021). Additionally, due to 
fears of repercussions from private creditors, only 44 out of the 73 eligible states have 
opted for participation (Fresnillo 2020). An additional concern lies with the new 
Common Framework: namely, how to coordinate restructurings across both private 
and official creditors, and how will many of China’s creditors be classified. As we have 
seen in the case of Angola (see Box 2), despite classifying the China Development 
Bank and the Industrial and Commercial Bank of China as commercial rather than 
official creditors, this action was taken unilaterally by China, which reserves the ability 
to classify creditor status at will in future restructurings on a case-by-case basis as 
outlined in the MoU of the Common Framework. As noted by Munevar, “private 
creditors will refuse to agree to debt write-offs unless commercial creditors from China 
participate on similar terms. Under the principle of comparability they will have the 
right to do so” (2020). While the new Common Framework is certainly a step in the 
right direction in terms of expanding the official creditor base required for burden 
sharing, many questions remain as to whether this approach will be sufficient in 
resolving future restructurings. Furthermore, as noted by J. P. Morgan, while the 
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Common Framework amends the fora for sovereign restructurings, it does not entirely 
replace existing avenues. It is therefore “conceivable that parallel discussions among 
private creditors, the Paris Club and the debtor country could be taking place, but 

















During the period of 2010 to 2020, Zambia saw its debt to GDP ratio increase 
over 600%29 and, ultimately, result in a default after the country missed payments on 
US$ 42.5 mln. worth of coupon payments (after 30 days grace) due on 14 October, 
2020. The missed payments marked a new chapter in a fraught situation that had 
been developing for a number of years, with growing concerns by private creditors 
over the lack of transparency involving Chinese lenders in the country. As noted by 
the IMF’s 2019 Article IV Report, “increased borrowing to finance large capital 
expenditure has led to a sharp increase in external debt and a shift in the creditor 
composition….There has also been a noticeable shift toward more non-concessional 
borrowing. Non-Paris Club official creditors hold about 29 percent of total outstanding 
external PPG debt, followed by Eurobond holders (25 percent), foreign banks (19 
percent), and foreign investors holding local currency debt (6 percent)” (IMF 2019).  
In September 2020, Zambia attempted to avert default by issuing a consent 
solicitation notice to creditors requesting a voluntary restructuring of claims (Republic 
of Zambia 2020), however, this offer was rejected by creditors on grounds that a “1) 
lack of transparency on Chinese debt and how it will be treated relative to Eurobonds; 
and 2) lack of meaningful progress towards an IMF program” (Curran 2020). This has 
sparked disagreement between the country’s Ministry of Finance, whose minister 
Bwalya Ng’andu, noted that, “we’ve given all the information that needs to be given 
concerning the Chinese debt" (Olander 2020). Furthermore, during the grace period, 
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the country announced that it had reached an agreement with the China Development 
Bank (CDB) on the deferral of payments owed (Yamba 2020). This comes in addition 
to various other deferrals and cancellations on Chinese creditors in recent years, 
including: US$ 40 mln. in 2001; US$ 211 mln. on debt incurred during the 1970s to 
finance the construction of the TAZARA railway line in 2006; cancellation of US$ 8 
mln. in 2007; cancellation of 50% of the remaining US% 150 mln. owed by TAZARA 
in 2011; and on-going negotiations of up to US% 4.4 bln. since 2017 (Kratz, Feng, 
and Wright 2019; Hurley, Morris, and Portelance 2019). 
Private creditors, however, remain unsatisfied with the current level of 
transparency, citing that “creditors have not received detailed information on the 
Chinese debt” (Olander 2020) and that the recent deferral of CDB payments only 
constitute a small amount of total Chinese claims (US$ 391 mln.) out of a total of US$ 
9.9 bln. owed (SAIS CARI n.d.).30 
Given that Zambia is already considered at ‘high risk’ of external debt distress 
(see Appendix Table 14. IMF List of Low-Income Countries; IMF 2021b), it is likely 
that the IMF would require a restructuring of private claims prior to engaging in a 
lending operation with the country (IMF 2015a). Private creditors, on the other hand, 
appear unwilling to relinquish their claim to the seniority of Chinese creditors through 
a restructuring, especially without the presence of an IMF program. This is especially 
the case given the strong stance taking by the creditor committee that “holds c40% of 
 
29 Zambia’s debt to GDP increased from c. 19% in 2010 (a low base following its HIPC completion point in 
2005; African Development Bank 2019) to c. 120% of GDP in 2020 (IMF 2020c) 
30 Total debt owed to China is c. 71% of Zambia’s GDP, which was US$ 14 bln. in 2020 (IMF 2020c) 
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Zambia’s Eurobonds (with a blocking across each of the three issues) and that is 
reportedly in “close contact” with another 30% of bondholders, creditors will have 
significant influence of how the restructuring unfolds” (Curran 2020). Given these 
constraints, it appears that the situation will remain at a standstill until an adequate 
degree of transparency regarding total Chinese claims can be established that will 




           Angola’s situation regarding Chinese creditors shares some similarities with 
that of Zambia, albeit, not nearly as fraught, largely as a result of the country not 
having missed any scheduled payments as well as currently being in an IMF program 
(IMF, 2021a). However, borrowing from China in Angola is significantly higher than in 
Zambia in nominal terms (US$ 42.6 bln. compared to US$ 9.9 bln.; SAIS CARI Loan 
Data n.d.) and roughly equal in terms of GDP (c. 68% in Angola compared to c. 71% 
in Zambia).31 As a result of remaining current on its payments, there is currently no 
impasse between the country and private creditors as is the case in Zambia; however, 
China’s lending has been a keystone in recent discussions between the country and 
the IMF, as well as the G20. In partaking in the G20/Paris Club’s Debt Service 
Suspension Initiative, Angola also agreed to seek relief from its bilateral creditors 
(Club de Paris 2020a) as was the case for further engagement in its IMF program; as 
noted by IMF’s Executive Board in its third program review in September, “the 
 
31 Angola’s 2020 GDP was US$ 62.74 bln. (IMF 2020). 
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[Angolan] authorities have secured debt reprofiling agreements from several large 
creditors to reduce risks related to debt sustainability. Continued vigilance in 
managing public debt is critical to mitigate such risks in the context of heightened oil-
price volatility” (2020). The most recent Staff Report (fourth review; IMF 2021a), noted 
that the referenced creditors were the China Development Bank (CDB) and the 
Industrial and Commercial Bank of China (ICBC) and that both had reprofiled the 
terms of loans over a three-year period (Arnold 2021). 
 
Lessons from China’s Involvement in Sovereign Restructurings: 
 
         The cases of Zambia and Angola offer important lessons in how China’s role in 
sovereign lending can shape the outcome of pre-emptive default resolutions. In the 
case of Zambia, despite a willingness to restructure part of its claims, a lack of 
transparency and unwillingness for further restructuring has created a stalemate 
situation. In effect, the unsustainable nature of Zambia’s debts prevents an IMF 
program from being initiated, which would be required for a subsequent Paris Club 
treatment, ultimately, resulting in a default on commercial creditors. In the case of 
Angola, China has offered a higher degree of transparency and willingness to 
reprofile claims, which has allowed Angola to receive treatment under the G20’s Debt 
Service Suspension Initiative, as well as to remain on-track in its IMF program. This 
divergence in outcomes highlights a fundamental issue, which is that China’s ability to 
preemptively engage with debtor countries can determine the outcome of whether 
countries will be able to receive debt relief or not. It does appear, however, that 
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China’s lending patterns are shifting, partially in order to prevent being in situations 
with excessively high risk of not being repaid and/or find themselves at the center of 
global debates surrounding sovereign defaults. As noted by Acker and Bräutigam, 
“data on Chinese lending to Africa from the past 10 years shows that Chinese 
financiers adapt to changing economic and political conditions in Africa as they learn 
from experiences with borrowers in debt distress and debt restructuring negotiations. 
Rather than continuing to blindly dump finance into countries with debt issues, 
Chinese financiers have shifted away from these countries - albeit belatedly in some 
cases, such as Zambia - and towards borrowers with stronger economies and debt 
management” (2021). As previously discussed (see Box 1), Zambia’s request for debt 
treatment through the G20’s Common Framework will serve as an early indicator of 














II. Measuring the Impact of China’s Sovereign Lending 
 
While it is easy to be swayed by the debt-trap diplomacy argument, the question 
of interest is whether these narratives are supported by existing data. Until recently, this 
would have been impossible to undertake as a comprehensive dataset of Chinese 
foreign lending did not exist. In order to answer this question, I explore two empirical 
issues: the first being whether or not the recent increase of Chinese lending has 
resulted in higher recorded incidence of distress (or default) and secondly, what are the 
post default implications when countries restructure their liabilities via versus outside the 
Paris Club.  
 
 
Observations of Default and Distress Episodes 
 
The first step in determining whether Chinese lending has led to an observable 
increase in default and distress incidence is to consider a set of sample statistics. 
Limiting our sample range from 2000 to 2017 (the years for which data on Chinese 
lending is available), I have recorded 487 and 1031 unique start of default and start of 
distress observations, respectively. Out of the 487 default observations, data by Horn, 
Reinhart, and Trebesch (HRT) found there was any amount of Chinese lending present 
in 256 of these cases (53%). Controlling for the size of lending by considering the size 
of Chinese lending in terms of borrower GDP, at the 5- and 10% level, results in 70 and 
46 observations, equivalent to 14% and 9%. These numbers decline even more when I 
consider start of distress episodes. Out of the 1031 unique episodes, HRT found any 
amount of Chinese lending present in 482 cases (47%); and 125 and 67 cases at the 
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5% and 10% levels, equivalent to just 12% and 6% of all observations. I can thus 
conclude that the vast majority of all default and distress episodes that have occurred 
over the past 20 years either do not involve Chinese lending or only involve Chinese 
lending at relatively modest levels. Based upon our set of sample statistics, a prima 
facie conclusion is that an increase in Chinese lending has not been a driver of either 
default or distress events. 
Figure 3. Presence of Chinese Lending in Default and Distress Episodes 
 
  
Note: Figure 3 shows the presence of Chinse lending in default and distress episodes. While Chinese 
lending has been found to be present in c. half of all observed default and distress events since 2000, its 
presence is greatly reduced when controlling for the size of lending. In 14% of default cases, Chinese 
lending was greater than 5% of the borrowing country’s GDP (12% for distress episodes) and only 9% 
when lending was greater than 10% of the borrowing country’s GDP (6% for distress episodes). 






















In order to draw inference about how an increase in Chinese lending has affected 
the outcomes of debtor countries, my first step is to identify the types of variables that 
have historically led to incidence of default or distress (DD events). In order to properly 
identify which variables serve as predictors of DD events, I constructed a dataset of 
sovereign defaults that could be coded as 0 or 1 dummies for each CountryYear 
observation in which a DD event occurred. This resulted in an immediate impediment; 
while there does exist a significant literature on sovereign defaults, there are relatively 
few publicly available datasets that record these events. Furthermore, this process is 
challenged by the fact that the existing datasets have vastly different coverage criteria, 
including country, time, and creditor differences. In order to create a single dataset to 
record incidence of DD events regarding all creditors, I compiled various different data 
sources to create a novel dataset that attempts to capture all incidence of sovereign 
default within the period of 1970 to 2020. This dataset includes observations of private 
Eurobond defaults via the Monthly Default and Restructuring Dataset (Trebesch and 
Asonuma 2020), Global Crisis Data (Reinhart et al. n.d.), Moody’s Default and Recovery 
Dataset (2020), Fitch’s Sovereign Transition and Default Study (2020), a list of 
Eurobond defaults occurring in 2020 by Culverhouse (2020), the IMF’s Monitoring of 
Fund Arrangements database (MONA), and a list of stress episodes presented in the 
appendices of the IMF’s most recent MAC DSA Review (2021c).32 
 
32 For a list of sources on sovereign default, see Abbas and Rogoff (2019). 
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I combined these datasets with the newly released Bank of Canada & Bank of 
England (BoC/BoE) Sovereign Default Database (Beers and Leon-Manlagnit 2019). 
This dataset is unique in that instead of expressly capturing incidents of default, it 
contains data on debtor countries’ total arrears broken down by creditor group. In order 
to translate this data to CountryYear observations of default, I have coded observations 
as being true in years in which total arrears increased from 0 to any positive value or 
total arrears more than doubled over the previous year. The first rule is likely quite 
intuitive in that a default should be recorded when a country begins to run arrears, i.e., 
legally obligated payments were missed and thus a default occurred. The latter rule, 
regarding the doubling over previous year’s arrears, is likely less intuitive. The reason 
that this has been coded as such is to capture new arrears that result from a new 
observation of missed payment. When considering the dataset, it is quite clear that once 
a country begins to run arrears, they are likely to remain in arrears for a number of 
years until a resolution can be found and the arrears can be cleared. Thus, each year in 
which arrears are present should not be considered a new and unique episode of 
default. If, however, I observe a non-zero amount of arrears that continue for a number 
of years and then suddenly increase, in this case by a factor of 2 or greater,33 this is 
considered to be a new and unique default observation (controlled for with 2-year lag of 
no default observations). 
 
33 The factor of 2X was chosen to capture non-insignificant increases of arrears scaled to the existing 




The final dataset that was added to complete my Default Dataset (Dielmann 
Default Data) was to record incidence of Paris Club Treatment. The dataset frequently 
cited for this data is the ‘List of Sovereign Debt Restructurings with the Paris Club 1950-
2010’ from the work of Das, Papaioannou, and Trebesch (2012). The trouble that I 
encountered with this dataset is that it was only current through 2010 and thus was 
largely out of sample when testing against data on Chinese lending from Horn, 
Reinhart, and Trebesch (2019), with earliest data from 2000. In order to rectify this 
coverage issue, I created a new dataset of Paris Club treatments based upon individual 
press release statements that are available on the Paris Club website. This new dataset 
consists of 469 individual observations covering 98 countries between 1956 and 2020. 
This creation of a unified default and distress dataset is a significant contribution to the 
literature of sovereign default. The new dataset covers 193 countries for the period of 













Table 2. Data Sources on Sovereign Default and Distress 
 
 
Note: Table 2 shows all sources of sovereign default datasets used to create the merged dataset used to 
generate the binary default and distress dummy variables. A variety of sources were used to create a 




Creating Default and Distress Dummies 
 
With the aforementioned dataset created, I then created 4 dependent binary 
dummy variables for each of the 3,044 CountryYear observations for whether the 
Country, in a given year, was in i) a state of default (‘In Default’) or in ii) a state of 
distress (‘In Distress’). ‘In default’ dummies were coded as a 1 if there was a default 
event recorded in: Asonuma and Trebesch’s ‘Monthly Default and Restructuring 
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Dataset’; the BoC-Boe Arrears Database (based upon the previously discussed rules); 
Fitch’s ‘Sovereign 2019 Transition and Default Study’; Moody’s ‘Sovereign Default and 
Recovery Rates’ dataset; receiving Paris Club treatment (from my collection of Paris 
Club press releases); or classified as a default event in Reinhart et al.’s ‘Global Crisis’ 
dataset (n.d.); and any manual additions made.34 Based on these criteria, I have 
recorded 1,675 unique observations for which a country is default between 1970 and 
2020. 
The second dummy, In Distress, is similar to In Default; however, it uses a lower 
hurdle for consideration. Thus, all events that are considered default are, by definition, 
considered distress events (In Default being a strict subset of In Distress). They can, 
however, also be triggered through: being in an IMF program; classified as a distress 
event (rather than default) in Reinhart et al.’s ‘Global Crisis’ dataset (n.d.); or being 
included as a distress observation in the IMF MAC DSA Review (2021c). Based on 
these criteria, I have recorded 2,877 unique observations for which a country is distress 
between 1970 and 2020. 
In addition to wanting to predict if a country will be in default or in distress in a 
given year, I also needed to test for the onset of both default and distress. I have 
therefore coded two additional dummy variables titled iii) ‘Start of Default’ and iv) ‘Start 
of Distress,’ where the dummy will be coded as a 1 if the country enters default or 
distress in a given year and it was neither in distress or in default within the 2 previous 
years (as with arrears observations, this criterion can easily be modified). Based on 
 




these criteria, I have recorded 649 unique observations for which a country enters a 
new default episode and 816 unique observations for which a country enters a new 
distress between 1970 and 2020. These additional criteria have been included in order 
to isolate default and distress events that are truly new onset cases, rather than being 




With these binary dummy variables successfully created, I am able to use these 
observations as the left-hand dependent variables in a logistic regression, as is 
customary in the sovereign default models (Manasse, Roubini, Schimmelpfennig 2003). 
Logistic regression models are the most appropriate when regressing upon a binary 
dependent variable, with other models being ruled out that include linear or log-linear 
(Poisson) models (those being appropriate for continuous or count variables as the 
dependent variable, respectively). This model will be further strengthened by employing 
a 1-Year lag in my independent data (i.e., 2012 GDP Growth as predictor of 2013 
Default, etc.) for macroeconomic data only available in annual increments. Ultimately, 
the aim of these regressive techniques will be to inform us of the likelihood of being in 
distress (as well as start of distress in later stages). Logistic regression models allow us 
to calculate the unknown probability, p, for any linear combination of independent 
variables where Y = 1. In this case, the CountryYear observation is either ‘In Distress’ or 
‘Start of Distress’.35 Such that: 
 
35 The full derivation of the logistic model can be found in the Appendix. 
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Logit(P) = ln [p(in distress) / 1 – p(in distress)] = 𝛴 ꞵjxj 
Once the probability, p, values are obtained, I am able to test the total predictive power 
of my model using the Area under the Receiver Operating Characteristic curve (AUC), 
which will be discussed in greater detail throughout this chapter. 
Model Specifications 
Using a dataset of 193 countries, spanning 2000 to 2017, I have 2,717 
CountryYear observations, resulting in a balanced panel. This allows me to regress a 
host of continuous independent variables upon my dependent dummy variable of choice 
(i-iv). Independent variables will serve two goals, the first being to determine which 
factors are relevant in predicting distress or default episodes, and secondly, to serve as 
control variables when attempting to determine the net effect that independent variables 
have upon recorded incidents of distress or default. To select baseline control variables, 
I was guided by earlier work on early warning models for sovereign default, in particular 
the work of Manasse, Roubini, and Schimmelpfennig (2003), Borensztein et al. (2000), 
Review of the Debt Sustainability Framework for Low Income Countries (IMF 2017), and 
Review of The Debt Sustainability Framework For Market Access Countries (IMF 
2021c), to select variables that fulfil a two-pronged goal, the first being that they show 
statistical significance in the logistic regression model and the second being to increase 
the total predictive power of the model as measured by the Area Under the Receiver 
Operating Characteristic Curve. The explanatory variables can be broadly classified as 
macroeconomic, financial, and development indicators. Where macroeconomic 
indicators include measures of a country’s: current account balance, debt to GDP ratio, 
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real GDP growth, as well as the log of debt owed to China and debt owed to China as a 
percent of the borrowing country’s GDP (for the regression models in which I include 
Chinese lending). Financial indicators include measures of a country’s: foreign currency 
reserves, months of import cover (as defined by total FX reserves over average import 
volumes in US$), and the average 6-month LIBOR rate. Development indicators include 
measures of a country’s: GDP per capita (as measured in PPP$), percent of eligible 
children that are enrolled in primary school, and the average expected life expectancy 
(measured at birth). Additionally, I employ a host of control variables, which include: a 
dummy variable to measure whether the country has experienced previous distress, a 
dummy variable if the country was in distress one year prior, as well as country and 
year dummy variables that are used in fixed, random, and mixed effects models. A full 
list of independent variables is shown below: 
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Note: Table 3 lists all independent and control variables used in the logistic regression models as well as 
a description of their role and source. 
Given the structure of the logistic model and the chosen independent variables, 
the four regression models are defined as follows: 
Table 3. List of Intendent Control Variables used in Logistic Regression Models 
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Testing ‘In Distress’ against independent variables without Chinese Lending: 
Logit(P) = ln [p(in distress) / 1 – p(in distress)] = 𝛴 ꞵj PreviousDistressj + ꞵjLagInDistressj 
+ ꞵjLagCABalancej + ꞵjLnDebttoGDPj + ꞵjLagGDPGrowthj + ꞵjLagGDPperCapitaj + 
ꞵjLnTotalReservesj + ꞵjLagImportCoverj + ꞵj6-MonthLIBORj + ꞵjUnemployment%j + 
ꞵjPrimarySchoolEnrollment%j + ꞵjLifeExpectancyj 
Testing ‘In Distress’ against independent variables with Chinese Lending: 
Logit(P) = ln [p(in distress) / 1 – p(in distress)] = 𝛴 ꞵj PreviousDistressj + ꞵjLagInDistressj 
+ ꞵjLagCABalancej + ꞵjLnDebttoGDPj + ꞵjLagGDPGrowthj + ꞵjLagGDPperCapitaj + 
ꞵjLnTotalReservesj + ꞵjLagImportCoverj + ꞵj6-MonthLIBORj + ꞵjUnemployment%j+ 
ꞵjPrimarySchoolEnrollment%j + ꞵjLifeExpectancyj + ꞵjLagLnDebttoChinaj + 
ꞵjLagDebttoChina%GDPj 
Testing ‘Start of Distress’ against independent variables without Chinese 
Lending: 
Logit(P) = ln [p(start of distress) / 1 – p(start of distress)] = 𝛴 ꞵj PreviousDistressj + 
ꞵjLagCABalancej + ꞵjLnDebttoGDPj + ꞵjLagGDPGrowthj + ꞵjLagGDPperCapitaj + 
ꞵjLnTotalReservesj + ꞵjLagImportCoverj + ꞵj6-MonthLIBORj + ꞵjUnemployment%j + 
ꞵjPrimarySchoolEnrollment%j + ꞵjLifeExpectancyj 
Testing ‘Start of Distress’ against independent variables with Chinese Lending: 
Logit(P) = ln [p(start of distress) / 1 – p(start of distress)] = 𝛴 ꞵj PreviousDistressj + 
ꞵjLagCABalancej + ꞵjLnDebttoGDPj + ꞵjLagGDPGrowthj + ꞵjLagGDPperCapitaj + 
ꞵjLnTotalReservesj + ꞵjLagImportCoverj + ꞵj6-MonthLIBORj + ꞵjUnemployment%j + 




The first stage model (i) is simply to run a pooled logistic regression of a series of 
independent variables that have been found to be statistically significant against the 
binary dependent variable ii. In Distress. The regression output is shown below: 




Note: Figure 4 shows the logistic regression output of the pooled, fixed, random, and mixed effects 












VARIABLES In Distress In Distress In Distress In Distress
Previous Distress 1.599*** 1.116* 1.788*** 1.860***
(0.268) (0.653) (0.325) (0.344)
In Distress (1 year lag) 1.507*** 0.802*** 1.221*** 1.149***
(0.094) (0.102) (0.107) (0.113)
Current Acct. Bal (1 year lag) -0.002 -0.014 -0.005 -0.000
(0.006) (0.008) (0.006) (0.006)
Ln of Debt to GDP (1 year lag) 0.208*** 0.033 0.221** 0.470***
(0.077) (0.142) (0.098) (0.110)
GDP Growth, % (1 year lag) -0.014 -0.027* -0.018 -0.023
(0.012) (0.016) (0.014) (0.015)
GDP Per Capita, PPP (1 year lag) -0.0000139*** 0.00000691 -0.0000146** -0.0000178**
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Ln Total Reserves, USD (1 year lag) 0.100*** 0.095 0.124*** 0.116**
(0.030) (0.124) (0.043) (0.047)
Import Cover, Months (1 year lag) -0.069*** -0.127*** -0.093*** -0.092***
(0.019) (0.043) (0.024) (0.026)
6-Month Libor -0.007 -0.055* -0.011 0.687***
(0.023) (0.032) (0.025) (0.186)
Unemployment, % 0.016** 0.099*** 0.030*** 0.032***
(0.007) (0.026) (0.011) (0.012)
Primary School Enrollment, % 0.007** 0.013* 0.010** 0.012**
(0.004) (0.007) (0.005) (0.005)
Life Expectancy at Birth -0.012 -0.091*** -0.021* -0.015
(0.008) (0.030) (0.011) (0.012)
Constant -5.324*** -5.680*** -10.863***
(0.875) (1.205) (1.626)
Observations 2,717 2,367 2,717 2,717
Number of Countries 155 128 155 155
Country FE No Yes Yes Yes
Year FE No No No Yes
Random Effects No No Yes Yes
Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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The later stage models control for fixed effects, random, and mixed effects. Fixed 
effect models will control for fixed, non-random characteristics of observations, in this 
case individual (country) specific characteristics. Random effects models will control for 
unobserved heterogeneity between groups that might be present as well as fixed 
(country) effects based on the specification of my panel. In addition to fixed and random 
effects models, I have also specified a mixed effects model, which controls for random 
effects (which include country fixed effects) as well as adding a time dummy variable 
(year) to control for increased likelihood of observing distress events occurring within 
given years.36 It is important to note that fixed effects models only include observations 
that observe variance in the dependent variables (i.e., countries that are observed to be 
both in distress and not in distress within the sample period). This results in 350 
observations, representing 7 Countries, being dropped as a result of not experiencing a 
distress incident (i.e., being ‘In Distress’) between 1970 and 2020.  
Assessing Total Predictive Power of Models Using the Area under the Receiver 
Operating Characteristic Curve 
 
 
In order to gauge the true predictive power of my models, I employ a technique 
known as the Area under the Receiver Operating Characteristic Curve (AUC). The aim 
of the AUC is to test for the model’s ability to discriminate between the likelihood of 
achieving a positive outcome, Y = 1, vs a negative outcome, Y = 0, of the predicted 
variable Yhat, by measuring the total area under the Receiver Operating Characteristic 
 
36 Time dummy variables are included in mixed effects models, however, the output has been removed 
from regression output tables as a matter of presentation. 
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(ROC) curve. While techniques such as Noise-to-Signal37 ratios aim to calibrate a 
model’s cutoff point to minimize the sum of Type 1 and Type 2 errors, the AUC 
considers the model’s accuracy by measuring the rate of observed ‘true positives’ and 
‘true negatives’ at each cutoff point continuously between 0% and 100% (Hosmer and 
Lemeshow 2000). This is done by measuring both the true positive rate of observations 
(‘sensitivity’) and the true negative rate of observations (‘1 - Specificity’) of the model as 
defined by the following formulas: 
Equation 1. Calculation of the True Positive and False Positive Rates 
 
Sensitivity refers to the true positive rate and specificity refers to the true 
negative rate. To put this more succinctly, “sensitivity refers the probability of true 
showing up true and specificity to the probability of false showing up false. Sensitivity 
and specificity are usually expressed in percentage” (Sharma, Yadav, and Sharma 






37 For a detailed discussion of the Noise-to-Signal ratio, see Aldasoro, Borio, and Drehmann (2018). 
# of True Positive Observations
True Positive Rate = Sensitivity = ( # of True Positive Observations + # of False Negative Observations)
# of False Positive Observations
False Positive Rate = 1 - Specificity = ( # of False Positive Observations + # of True Negative Observations)
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Figure 5. Four Quadrants of AUC Confusion Matrix 
 
 
Note: Figure 5 shows the ‘confusion matrix’ used to generate the Area Under the Receiver Operating 
Characteristic Curve. Any predictive model will generate one of four possible outcomes: correctly 
predicting a true positive event (correctly predicting a positive event), a true negative event (correctly 
predicting a non-event), a type 1 error (incorrectly predicting a positive even in the case of a non-event), 
and a type 2 error (incorrectly predicting a non-event in the case of a positive event). True positive and 
true negative observations will be used to calculate the sensitivity and specificity of the AUC. 
 
The next step in calculating the AUC is to plot the ROC curve, where the Y-axis 
is defined as the sensitivity (that being the true positive rate) and the X-axis defined as 
the false positive rate, which is equal to (1 – specificity), with both axes ranging from 0 
to 1. The area underneath the resulting ROC curve provides a measure of the model’s 
ability to “discriminate between those subjects who experience the outcome of interest 
versus those who do not” (Hosmer and Lemeshow 2000). This graphically results in an 
upward sloping 45-degree line for a model with 50% accuracy (one that does not 
provide any predictive power) and the generated ROC curve superimposed. As the 
model’s ability to discriminate between true positive and false positive observations 
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increases (thus the model’s predictive power increases over 50%), the ROC curve will 
bend concavely towards the northeasterly corner of the chart (IMF 2021c). The total 
area under the ROC curve represents a “single scalar value that measures the overall 
performance of a binary classifier” and thus the total predictive power of the logistic 
regression model (Melo 2013). 
Figure 6. AUC of Pooled Logistic Model 
 
 
Note: Figure 6 shows the generated AUC curve for the first stage pooled logistic regression model. The 
value of 0.7672 translates in a total predive power of the model of 76.72%. See Appendix for AUC curves 
of all regression models. 
 
The AUC of the pooled logistic regression, without controlling for either fixed or 
random effects results, produced a total area under the curve of 0.7672. Intuitively this 
result implies that the model currently predicts whether a CountryYear observation will 
be in distress with c. 77% accuracy, which is considered acceptable discrimination in 
the literature.38  
 
38 AUC values <= 0.7 and < 0.8 are considered acceptable, values <=0.8 and < 0.9 are considered 
excellent, and values >= 0.9 are considered outstanding (noting that it is “extremely unusual” to find areas 
under the curve greater than 0.9; Hosmer and Lemeshow (2000)). 
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Next, I test the AUC for the additional logistic models that control for fixed, 
random, and mixed effects. It is important to recall that fixed effects models only include 
observations that observe variance in the dependent variables and thus result in a 
smaller number of observations. This decline also contributes to a decrease in total 
predictive power as measured by the AUC. Thus, they should not be compared against 
other non-fixed effect models. The results are shown in the table below. 
Table 4. Area under ROC Curve (AUC) for Logistic Regression Models for ‘In 
Distress’39 
Note: Table 4 shows the AUC of the pooled logit, fixed, random, and mixed effect models at predicting 
whether a CountryYear observation will be in distress. The Fixed Effects model shows lower predictive 
power than other models, in part due to a smaller sample size that results from fixed effects models 
dropping observations that had zero variance in the dependent variable. The mixed effects model shows 
the highest predictive power at 78.87%. 
 
The next step is to repeat the above process while also including independent 
variables on Chinese lending. The aim of doing so will be to test, once properly 
specified and controlled, whether an increase in Chinese lending leads to an increase in 
total predictive power of the model; where an increase in predictive power indicates the 
statistical significance of Chinese lending on countries observing incidents of distress. 
To do this, I include two observations of Chinse lending from the Chinese Debt Stock 
 




Standard Error of 
AUC
AUC
Pooled Logit 2,717 0.009 0.749 0.786 76.72%
Fixed Effects 2,367 0.012 0.612 0.657 63.42%
Random Effects 2,717 0.009 0.744 0.781 76.29%





Data by Horn, Reinhart, and Trebesch (HRT; 2019). The first variable that I include is 
the log of total Chinese debt, in US$, held by the borrowing country, and the second 
variable is the total amount of Chinese debt as a percent of the borrowing country’s 
















Figure 7. Logistic Regression Models w/ Effects, w/ FE, w/ RE, w/ ME w/Chinese 
Lending Against ‘In Distress’ 
 
 
Note: Figure 7 shows the logistic regression output of the pooled, fixed, random, and mixed effect models 
against the CountryYear observation being in distress, with the inclusion of data on Chinese lending. The 
log of Debt to China is significant at the 10% level in the random effects model and at the 5% level in the 
mixed effects model, while not significant at the 10% level in either the pooled logit or fixed effects model. 












VARIABLES In Distress In Distress In Distress In Distress
Previous Distress 1.612*** 1.116* 1.811*** 1.876***
(0.268) (0.653) (0.326) (0.347)
In Distress (1 year lag) 1.498*** 0.800*** 1.210*** 1.134***
(0.094) (0.102) (0.107) (0.113)
Current Acct. Bal (1 year lag) -0.003 -0.013 -0.006 -0.001
(0.006) (0.008) (0.006) (0.006)
Ln of Debt to GDP (1 year lag) 0.198** 0.024 0.199** 0.452***
(0.077) (0.143) (0.098) (0.110)
GDP Growth, % (1 year lag) -0.013 -0.027* -0.017 -0.022
(0.012) (0.016) (0.014) (0.015)
GDP Per Capita, PPP (1 year lag) -0.0000166*** 0.00000148 -0.0000194*** -0.0000228***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Ln Total Reserves, USD (1 year lag) 0.106*** 0.150 0.143*** 0.134***
(0.031) (0.132) (0.045) (0.049)
Import Cover, Months (1 year lag) -0.070*** -0.136*** -0.096*** -0.095***
(0.019) (0.044) (0.024) (0.026)
6-Month Libor -0.028 -0.061* -0.037 0.634***
(0.025) (0.033) (0.027) (0.188)
Unemployment, % 0.014* 0.095*** 0.027** 0.030**
(0.007) (0.026) (0.011) (0.012)
Primary School Enrollment, % 0.007** 0.014** 0.011** 0.012**
(0.004) (0.007) (0.005) (0.005)
Life Expectancy at Birth -0.013 -0.084*** -0.022* -0.018
(0.008) (0.030) (0.012) (0.013)
Ln of Debt to China, USD (1 year lag) -0.008 -0.013 -0.014* -0.018**
(0.006) (0.010) (0.008) (0.009)
Debt to China, % GDP (1 year lag) -0.012 0.000 -0.009 -0.001
(0.010) (0.013) (0.011) (0.011)
Constant -5.177*** -5.725*** -10.625***
(0.882) (1.221) (1.650)
Observations 2,717 2,367 2,717 2,717
Number of Countries 155 128 155 155
Country FE No Yes Yes Yes
Year FE No No No Yes
Random Effects No No Yes Yes
Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Based on the regression output, I find that the first new variable, the Log of Debt 
owed to China in US$, is significant at the 10% level in the random effects model, 
significant at the 5% level in the mixed effects model, and not significant at a minimum 
10% level in either the pooled logistic model or fixed effects model. The second 
variable, Debt owed to China as a % of the borrower’s GDP, was not significant at the 
10% level in any of the four models. The full regression output table for ‘In Distress’ with 
and without the inclusion of Chinese lending variables is shown in the Appendix. 
  While the independent observations of Chinese lending are not statistically 
significant in the majority of the specified models, I also need to determine whether the 
total predictive power of the models has increased. To do this, I again test for the AUC 
under these new conditions. The results are shown below: 
Table 5. Area under ROC Curve (AUC) for Logistic Regression Models with 
Chinese Lending for ‘In Distress’ with and without Chinese Lending 
Note: Table 5 shows the AUCs for the pooled logit, fixed, random, and mixed effect models at predicting 
whether a CountryYear observation will be in distress. While the addition of Chinese lending does 
increase the AUC in the pooled, fixed, and random effect models, the increase is negligible. The highest 







Pooled Logit 2,717 0.009 0.749 0.786 76.72%
Pooled Logit with China 2,717 0.009 0.750 0.787 76.85%
Fixed Effects 2,367 0.012 0.612 0.657 63.42%
Fixed Effects with China 2,367 0.012 0.612 0.657 63.44%
Random Effects 2,717 0.009 0.744 0.781 76.29%
Random Effects with China 2,717 0.009 0.746 0.783 76.41%
Mixed Effects 2,717 0.009 0.771 0.806 78.87%





Based upon the total predictive power of the models, as determined by AUCs, I 
do not find that the inclusion of variables measuring the size of Chinese lending leads to 
an increase in total predictive power. Across four models, the inclusion resulted in 
average improvement of only 0.06%.40  
Predicting the Start of Distress  
 
Being interested in the onset of a crisis rather than just whether or not a country 
will be in distress, I repeat the previous steps, however, now regressing upon the binary 
dummy variable ‘Start of Distress’ rather than ‘In Distress.’ The regression output with 
and without Chinese lending is shown below. (Please note that the full regression output 
table for ‘Start of Distress’ with and without the inclusion of Chinese lending variables 








40 It is important to note that (unless overfitting has occurred) the inclusion of any additional variables is 
likely to either increase the AUC or leave it unchanged as any coefficient other than 0 will increase the 
AUC even if it is found to be statistically insignificant.  
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Figure 8. Logistic Regression Models w/ FE, w/ RE, w/ ME Against ‘Start of 
Distress’ 
Note: Figure 8 shows the logistic regression output of the pooled, fixed, random, and mixed effect models 













VARIABLES Start of Distress Start of Distress Start of Distress Start of Distress
Previous Distress? 1.984*** 1.370** 2.223*** 2.312***
(0.263) (0.638) (0.378) (0.395)
Current Acct. Bal (1 year lag) 0.002 -0.013 -0.005 0.002
(0.005) (0.009) (0.006) (0.007)
Ln of Debt to GDP (1 year lag) 0.291*** 0.079 0.283*** 0.624***
(0.073) (0.140) (0.109) (0.120)
GDP Growth, % (1 year lag) -0.034*** -0.038** -0.036** -0.038**
(0.012) (0.015) (0.014) (0.015)
GDP Per Capita, PPP (1 year lag) -0.00002*** 0.00000102 -0.0000186** -0.0000202**
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Ln Total Reserves, USD (1 year lag) 0.129*** 0.133 0.163*** 0.132**
(0.029) (0.122) (0.054) (0.058)
Import Cover, Months (1 year lag) -0.089*** -0.146*** -0.129*** -0.117***
(0.018) (0.042) (0.027) (0.029)
6-Month Libor -0.011 -0.065** -0.025 0.791***
(0.022) (0.032) (0.026) (0.186)
Unemployment, % 0.022*** 0.126*** 0.055*** 0.052***
(0.007) (0.026) (0.014) (0.015)
Primary School Enrollment, % 0.008** 0.014** 0.013** 0.014***
(0.003) (0.007) (0.005) (0.005)
Life Expectancy at Birth -0.013* -0.097*** -0.034** -0.023
(0.007) (0.029) (0.014) (0.015)
Constant -5.790*** -6.000*** -11.920***
(0.832) (1.446) (1.847)
Observations 2,717 2,367 2,717 2,717
Number of Countries 155 128 155 155
Country FE No Yes No Yes
Year FE No Yes No Yes
Random Effects No No Yes Yes
Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Table 6. Area under ROC Curve (AUC) for Logistic Regression Models (without 
China) for ‘Start of Distress’ 
 
Note: Table 6 shows the AUC of the pooled logit, fixed, random, and mixed effect models at predicting 
whether a CountryYear observation being the start year of distress. The fixed effects model shows lower 
predictive power than other models, in part due to a smaller sample size that results from fixed effects 
models dropping observations that had zero variance in the dependent variable. The mixed effects model 
shows the highest predive power at 72.69%. In each case, the AUC is lower when predicting the start 

































Pooled Logit 2,717 0.010 0.664 0.705 68.44%
Fixed Effects 2,367 0.012 0.576 0.622 59.90%
Random Effects 2,717 0.010 0.663 0.703 68.31%





Figure 9. Logistic Regression Models w/ FE, w/ RE, w/ ME w/Chinese Lending 
Against ‘Start of Distress’ 
 
 
Note: Figure 9 shows the logistic regression output of the pooled, fixed, random, and mixed effect models 
against the CountryYear observation being the start year of distress, with the inclusion of data on Chinese 
lending. The log of Debt to China is significant at the 5% level in the random effects model and at the 1% 
level in the mixed effects model, while not significant at the 10% level in either the pooled logit or fixed 
effects model. Debt to China as a percentage of borrower GDP is not significant at the 10% level in any of 
the four models. 
Based on this regression output, I find that the Log of Debt owed to China in US$ 
to be significant at the 10% level in the pooled logistic model, the 5% level in the 
random effects model, at the 1% level in the mixed effects model, and not significant at 









VARIABLES Start of Distress Start of Distress Start of Distress Start of Distress
Previous Distress? 1.999*** 1.368** 2.248*** 2.316***
(0.263) (0.638) (0.378) (0.397)
Current Acct. Bal (1 year lag) 0.000 -0.013 -0.006 0.001
(0.005) (0.009) (0.006) (0.007)
Ln of Debt to GDP (1 year lag) 0.277*** 0.069 0.251** 0.590***
(0.073) (0.141) (0.109) (0.120)
GDP Growth, % (1 year lag) -0.031*** -0.038** -0.033** -0.036**
(0.012) (0.015) (0.014) (0.015)
GDP Per Capita, PPP (1 year lag) -0.0000234*** -0.00000508 -0.0000258*** -0.0000275***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Ln Total Reserves, USD (1 year lag) 0.136*** 0.195 0.194*** 0.159***
(0.030) (0.129) (0.056) (0.059)
Import Cover, Months (1 year lag) -0.092*** -0.156*** -0.133*** -0.121***
(0.018) (0.043) (0.028) (0.029)
6-Month Libor -0.038 -0.071** -0.054** 0.723***
(0.024) (0.032) (0.028) (0.188)
Unemployment, % 0.020*** 0.121*** 0.050*** 0.049***
(0.007) (0.026) (0.014) (0.015)
Primary School Enrollment, % 0.008** 0.014** 0.013** 0.015***
(0.003) (0.007) (0.005) (0.006)
Life Expectancy at Birth -0.014* -0.089*** -0.032** -0.025*
(0.007) (0.030) (0.014) (0.015)
Ln of Debt to China, USD (1 year lag) -0.010* -0.014 -0.020** -0.024***
(0.006) (0.010) (0.008) (0.009)
Debt to China, % GDP (1 year lag) -0.015 -0.001 -0.008 0.000
(0.010) (0.012) (0.011) (0.012)
Constant -5.596*** -6.355*** -11.711***
(0.838) (1.455) (1.863)
Observations 2,717 2,367 2,717 2,717
Number of Countries 155 128 155 155
Country FE No Yes No Yes
Year FE No Yes No Yes
Random Effects No No Yes Yes
Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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borrower’s GDP was not significant at the 10% level in any of the four regression 
models. Testing for the total predictive power of the models, I again find that the 
inclusion of variables measuring the size of Chinese lending leads to a negligible 
increase in total predictive power of the models. Across four models, the inclusion 
resulted in average improvement of only 0.24%.  
Table 7. Joint Area under ROC Curve (AUC) for Logistic Regression Models with 
and without Chinese Lending ‘Start of Distress’ 
Note: Table 7 shows the AUCs for the pooled logit, fixed, random, and mixed effect models at predicting 
whether a CountryYear observation being the start year of distress. While the addition of Chinese lending 
does increase the AUC in all models, the increase is negligible. 
Based upon the results of these logistic regression models as well as the AUCs 
to test for total predictive power, I reject the hypothesis that recent increases in Chinese 
lending have had a statistically significant effect on the likelihood that countries will 








Pooled Logit 2,717 0.010 0.664 0.705 68.44%
Pooled Logit with China 2,717 0.010 0.667 0.708 68.78%
Fixed Effects 2,367 0.012 0.576 0.622 59.90%
Fixed Effects with China 2,367 0.012 0.577 0.623 59.98%
Random Effects 2,717 0.010 0.663 0.703 68.31%
Random Effects with China 2,717 0.010 0.667 0.708 68.76%
Mixed Effects 2,717 0.009 0.708 0.746 72.69%





Has a Growth in Chinese Lending Over Time Altered the Results? 
 
  Based on aforementioned results of the logistic regression models to test for 
statistical significance of increased Chinese lending on recorded instances of default 
and distress, I have been unable to determine that they are indeed significant. This, 
however, leads me to a new question: whether the increase in Chinese lending that has 
been recorded by Horn, Reinhart, and Trebesch between 2000 and 2017 (2019; see 
Figure 10) represents a structural break between ‘early’ and ‘later’ years. 










Note: Figure 10 shows the annual total amount of direct lending, i.e., loans from Chinese creditors to 
borrowing countries, in billions of US$. In order to test whether higher lending rates in later years result in 
different levels of statistical significance, the sample period is split into two periods; Period 1 from 2000 to 
2008 and Period 2 from 2009 to 2017. 
Source: Horn, Reinhart, and Trebesch (2019). 
 
While the direct sovereign loans owed to China have increased in every year 
between 2000 and 2017, one can ask whether small increases in ‘early’ years 
contribute to likelihood of witnessing a default or distress event as much as the 














Splitting the sample into two equal time periods, I am left with two distinct periods: 
Period 1 from 2000 to 2008 and Period 2 from 2009 to 2017. Using 2009 as the start 
year of Period 2 also conveniently aligns itself with the onset of the Global Financial 
Crisis. 
 Repeating the earlier regression models on the now split sample, I find that 
neither the Log of Debt owed to China nor Debt owed to China as a % of the borrower’s 
GDP was statistically significant at the 10% level in either the pooled logistic, fixed, or 
random effects models, for either the Pre or Post 2009 sample (8 total models; full 
regression output can be found in the Appendix), while the Debt owed to China as a % 
of borrower’s GDP was significant at the 10% level in the mixed effects model in the Pre 
2009 period only. These findings suggest that neither measure of Chinese lending can 
be said to be statistically significant when measured against a country being in distress. 
 The next stage is to again test for the total predictive power of my models for the 
pre 2009 and post 2009 samples, with and without the inclusion of measures of Chinese 










Table 8. Joint Area under ROC Curve (AUC) for Logistic Regression Models with 
and without Chinese Lending for ‘In Distress’; Pre and Post 2009. 
 
 
Note: Table 8 shows the AUCs for the pooled logit, fixed, random, and mixed effect models at predicting 
whether a CountryYear observation will be in distress for Period 1, Period 2, and the total time period. 
While the AUC does increase when considering sub-periods, as compared to the total time period, the 
addition of Chinese lending has only a negligible effect on increasing total predictive power of the models. 
 
The total predictive power of the models is marginally improved when dividing the 
sample into two distinct time periods (comparing from left to right in the previous table; 
an average increase of 0.88%), with the exception of the Fixed Effects model.41 These 
findings suggest that there are potential merits in designing early warning models based 
 
41 As previously discussed, the Fixed Effects model drops country observations for which there was no 








Pooled Logit 76.72% 78.65% 77.16%
(2717) (1458) (1259)
Pooled Logit with China 76.85% 78.87% 77.25%
(2717) (1458) (1259)
Fixed Effects 63.42% 61.12% 62.45%
(2367) (1131) (949)
Fixed Effects with China 63.44% 61.26% 62.57%
(2367) (1131) (949)
Random Effects 76.29% 78.47% 76.60%
(2717) (1458) (1259)
Random Effects with China 76.41% 78.66% 76.68%
(2717) (1458) (1259)
Mixed Effects 78.87% 80.66% 77.13%
(2717) (1458) (1259)




on time periods that share common characteristics, or epochs as suggested by 
Aggarwal (1996) albeit minor. However, if I consider the inclusion of measures of 
Chinese lending (comparing from top to bottom in the previous table; an average 
increase of 0.19%), as with our full-time sample, I do not see any significant increases 
in total predictive power of my models once I control for Chinese lending. 
  Next, I repeat the previous process, however, now testing against the ‘Start of 
Distress’ rather than ‘In Distress’ and again find that neither Log of Debt owed to China 
nor Debt owed to China as a percent of the borrower’s GDP is statistically significant at 
the 10% level in any of the four models for the Post 2009 sample (8 total models; full 
regression output can be found in Appendix). In the Pre 2009 sample, I find that only the 
Log of Debt owed to China was significant at the 10% level in the mixed effects model, 
and not significant at the minimum 10% level in any of the other models. Debt owed to 
China as a % of Borrower’s GDP was not significant at the minimum 10% level in any of 
the four models. 
 Testing for total predictive power of the models using the AUC, I again find 
evidence that suggests early warning models could be strengthened through the use of 
qualified time periods; however, there does not appear to be any significant 
improvement in total predictive power with the inclusion of measures of Chinese lending 






Table 9. Joint Area under ROC Curve (AUC) for Logistic Regression Models with 
and without Chinese Lending for ‘Start of Distress’; Pre and Post 2009. 
 
Note: Table 9 shows the AUCs for the pooled logit, fixed, random, and mixed effect models at predicting 
whether a CountryYear observation being the start year of distress for Period 1, Period 2, and the total 
time period. While the AUC does increase when considering sub-periods, as compared to the total time 
period, the addition of Chinese lending has only a negligible effect on increasing total predative power of 
the models. 
 
The Importance of Interest Rates 
 
It is important to note that the sample period for which I have data on Chinese 
lending, that being the years from 2000 to 2017, coincides with a period of historically 
low interest rates. It is therefore a reasonable assumption that the current low interest 








Pooled Logit 68.44% 72.08% 71.04%
(2717) (1458) (1259)
Pooled Logit with China 68.78% 72.35% 71.30%
(2717) (1458) (1259)
Fixed Effects 59.90% 59.50% 62.53%
(2367) (1131) (949)
Fixed Effects with China 59.98% 59.43% 62.54%
(2367) (1131) (949)
Random Effects 68.31% 70.98% 70.84%
(2717) (1458) (1259)
Random Effects with China 68.76% 71.38% 71.02%
(2717) (1458) (1259)
Mixed Effects 72.69% 74.31% 72.49%
(2717) (1458) (1259)




incidents caused by an increase in Chinese lending. This assumption would be based 
upon both the impact that higher rates have on the increased cost associated with 
rolling-over existing debt that is falling due (i.e., using the proceeds of a new bond issue 
to repay the liabilities that are maturing), as well as the endogenous component of the r-
g differential of a country’s debt dynamics. This differential posits that, holding other 
factors constant, a country’s debt to GDP ratio in period T+1 will increase by the 
differential, i.e., real interest rates minus its real GDP growth rate, multiplied by its debt 
to GDP ratio in period T0. As interest rates increase, the cost of serving its debt 
becomes more expensive, requiring increases in debt issuance to cover these 
additional interest costs, ultimately contributing to a higher debt stock.42 
In order to answer the question as to whether a low number of default and 
distress episodes can be attributed to the current interest rate environment, I have 
tested the impact of interest rates in two different ways, the first being a set of simple 
sample statistics that show the total number of default episodes that occurred within a 
decade vs. the average LIBOR rates during these periods, and the second is to test the 
marginal effect that LIBOR rates have on whether a country witnesses the start of a 
distress episode. 
 When considering the sample statistics, I find that despite a period of falling 
LIBOR rates, on average per decade, since their introduction in 1986, the number of 
default episodes actually increased from the 1980s to the 2000s, recording 113 events 
in the 1980s, 123 events in the 1990s, and 151 events in the 2000s. It was only during 
 
42 For a detailed discussion on debt dynamics and the impact of the r-g differential on debt to GDP ratios, 
see IMF 2013 Annex I. Debt Dynamics. 
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the 2010s, that the number of default episodes actually decreased to 102 unique 
events, suggesting a weak relationship between rates and the number of observed 
default episodes. These figures can be seen below in Figure 12. 
 




Note: Figure 11 shows the total number of unique sovereign default events occurring per decade 
compared to the average LIBOR rates within that period. Despite LIBOR rates having fallen in each 
decade since the 1980s, total default episodes actually increased in the 1990s and 2000s. It was only in 
the 2010s that a decline in sovereign default episodes coincided with a decline in LIBOR rates. 




The second test that I conducted to determine the relationship between interest 




























1980s 1990s 2000s 2010s
Default Episodes Per Decade (LHS) vs.  LIBOR Rates (RHS)# %
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between LIBOR rates and the onset of distress events. By holding all the other 
independent variables at their mean values within the sample period, I was able to test 
the marginal effect that LIBOR rates have on whether a country observes the start of a 
distress event, at various levels of rates. I have tested the marginal effect at four 
different levels of LIBOR rates, those being at 0.33% (which represents the lowest 
annual LIBOR rate in the 2000-2017 sample), 2.13% (the mean annual LIBOR rate for 
the 2000-2017 sample), 6.66% (the highest annual LIBOR rate for the 2000-2017 
sample), and 9.23% (the highest total annual LIBOR rate since introduction of LIBOR in 
1986, which occurred in 1989). 
 
Figure 12. Marginal Effect Graph for 
LIBOR Against ‘In Distress’ 
Figure 13. Marginal Effect Graph for 
LIBOR Against 'Start of Distress' 
  
 
Note: Figures 12 & 13 show the marginal effect on the probability that countries are either in distress or 
witness a start of distress episode in a given year. In both cases, the marginal effect of LIBOR rates on a 
country being in distress or witnessing the start of a distress episode are negative, suggesting that 
increases in LIBOR rates are unlikely to result in increased distress episodes. 




Although, as already discussed, a country’s debt dynamics are negatively 
affected by increasing rates, the empirical analysis of the data over the past 35 years 
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suggests that rates are unlikely to have a meaningful impact on default episodes in a 
systematic way. When considering the marginal effects graph, not only do I find that the 
likelihood of witnessing a start of distress episodes actually decreases with each 
successive increase in rates, but based upon their 95% confidence interval, they are not 
distinguishable from one another. This suggests that the change in probability of a new 
distress episode based upon changes in LIBOR Rates is not statistically different from 
zero. While these findings are counter-intuitive, they could be explained in two primary 
ways, the first being that countries that default appear to do so based on unique 
challenges faced by characteristics by the defaulting country at that point in time rather 
than global factors affecting all countries. A second reason that could explain these 
findings is that only a subset of a country’s total borrowing will be done at commercial 
rates, i.e., using the types of instruments that would be particularly sensitive to rate 
changes. While advanced market economies are likely to see the majority of their 
borrowing done on a commercial basis, these countries are also the most capable of 
avoiding a default due to their pre-existing levels of wealth. Low-income and emerging 
market economies that are historically more prone to witnessing default episodes will 
likely have a much smaller proportion of their total borrowing on commercial terms. 
 Both of these findings suggest that the current low interest rate environment has 
not served as a significant driver in the findings that Chinese lending has not 






Stylized Facts from Regression Output 
 
 Ultimately, the results do not support the notion that an increase in Chinese 
lending has led to an increase in the number of observed distress incidents, neither 
measured as a CountryYear observation being in distress, nor observing the start of a 
distress event. In order to reach these findings, I have used four separate logistic 
regression models, including a pooled logistic model as well as fixed, random, and 
mixed effects models. In each of these cases, the addition of Chinse lending variables 
does not result in any meaningful increase in the total predictive power of the models as 
measured by statistical significance of independent covariates or through the AUC. 
Repeating this exercise to include a structural break to control for a change in Chinese 
lending patterns occurring in 2009 also does not result in any recorded significance of 
independent covariates at the 10% level in any of the models. Thus, I conclude that the 
observed increase in Chinese lending that has occurred over the past two decades has 









III. Why the Paris Club – Do Empirical Observations Suggest That 
Countries That Receive Paris Club Treatment Witness Materially Better 
Economic Outcomes Than Those That Do Not? 
   
The second empirical question that I intend to answer is whether or not countries 
that receive treatment from the Paris Club witness statistically improved macroeconomic 
outcomes compared to those that do not. While it may seem obvious that countries that 
receive significant debt relief, in conjunction with an IMF lending program, should 
witness improved outcomes, it is not a question that I have seen addressed in the 
literature on sovereign defaults. This partly relates to the aforementioned discussion on 
lack of data availability, both with respect to Paris Club treatments and any pre-existing 
dataset on sovereign defaults. My dataset contains this data, allows for the separation 
of event types, and thus makes analysis on economic outcomes possible. 
With the necessary data collected, the first step in conducting this analysis 
required the separation of default incidents into default episodes that were triggered as 
a result of Paris Club (PC) treatment and those that resulted from non-Paris Club (non-
PC) treatment. Data on non-PC defaults required an additional step, which was to 
ensure that the event was fully independent of any PC involvement. In other words, to 
ensure that I only consider the isolated impact of a non-PC outcome (thus isolating the 
treatment effect of PC treatment in comparison), I control for there not being any PC 
treatment that occurred within +/− 2 years of the recorded default.  
In the absence of being able to randomize selection of treatment, I am employing 
a difference-in-difference design that centers default episodes around Time 0 (T0), and 
then considers the path of a host of macroeconomic variables in the three years prior to 
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default episode and three years post-default. While this method of examining 
performance pre and post default centered around T0 is not unique, I am unaware of 
prior literature that has focused on demonstrating improved macroeconomic conditions 
of debtor countries that result from Paris Club treatment. Just as in the discussions 
above, this is likely due to the lack of available datasets that provide sufficient coverage 
on default type and allow for the easy separation of events. 
It is important to note that there is substantial heterogeneity between these 
samples, i.e., by definition, countries receiving Paris Club treatment are either classified 
as low-income or emerging market countries and have a significantly higher debt to 
GDP ratio prior to treatment (see Figure 17). While it is unlikely that we can ever fully 
control for the starting differences in selection, the aim of analyzing the treatment effect 
will always be to try and “distinguish the effects of a treatment from the effects of the 
conditions under which the treatment is applied” (Przeworksi 2009). This is, at least 
partially, achieved by conducting a second round of analysis on a third group of 
countries that likely would have qualified for Paris Club treatment based on their ex-ante 
debt to GDP levels, yet were ineligible to receive treatment as they were not classified 
as a low-income or emerging market (e.g., Greece 2012) or were not in an IMF program 
(e.g., Mozambique 2015). The observations within this third group of cases were 
selected based on having a debt to GDP level that was equal to or higher than the 25th 
percentile of cases that did receive Paris Club treatment in period T-1., which meant 




a. Effect of Paris Club Treatment on Real GDP Growth 
 




Average Cumulative Growth, T0 to T3: 
+15.62% 
Average Cumulative Growth, T0 to T3: 
+10.97% 
Note: Figure 14 shows the change in countries’ real GDP growth between T-3 and T3 for those receiving 
Paris Club treatment vs. those that did not. On average, countries that receive Paris Club treatment grew 
at higher rates than those that did not. 
 
From Figure 15, one can see that on average, GDP in countries that received 
Paris Club treatment grew at a higher rate than those countries that did not. The 
average cumulative growth of the period from T0 to T3 was 15.62% for countries that 
received Paris Club Treatment compared to 10.97% for those that did not. Furthermore, 
means and variance tests confirm at the 1% level of significance that these outcomes 
are indeed distinct from each other.4344  
This overall improvement includes several components: a reduction in debt 
overhang, improved perception of the country’s prospects following a coordinated 
outcome with bilateral creditors, and potentially regaining market access, thus further 
 
43 Note that charts with this chapter show the median line of underlying data. This line will not be perfectly 
centered between 25th and 75th percentile bands unless the underlying data contains zero skew. 










T-3 T-2 T-1 T0 T+1 T+2 T+3











T-3 T-2 T-1 T0 T+1 T+2 T+3




reducing borrowing costs. There are a number of underlying reasons. One is that the 
aim of restoring debt sustainability of a country requires a strong growth plan as a 
necessary component. As found by Kumar and Woo (2010), the inverse relationship 
between initial debt levels and growth suggests that the debt reduction as part of the 
Paris Club treatment translates to higher observed levels of growth. This is partly 
related to the existing debt overhang being removed, thus freeing up fiscal space that 
can be shifted towards social spending, as well as an improved investor perception that 
contributes towards improved economic outcomes. This function might also take place 
on a micro level as Ong, Theseira, and Ng (2019) note, as reduced debt levels have a 
beneficial psychological effect on low-income individuals and households, resulting in a 
subsequent spurt in economic activity. When we consider the change in growth in the 
criteria-eligible group, that being the group of countries that had ex-ante debt to GDP 
ratios that would have qualified them to receive treatment, yet did not based upon other 
selection criteria, we can see that real GDP growth was positive during the period from 
T0 to T3, with an average cumulative growth of 11.73%. Whiel this is a higher figure than 
recorded in the full non-Paris Club sample, it remains lower than the group of countries 








Figure 15. Real GDP Growth, Pre and Post Default, for non-Paris Club Treatment 
on Criteria Eligible Cases 
 
Note: Figure 15 shows the median real GDP growth rate for the criteria-eligible group of countries 
between T-3 and T3. This group did not receive Paris Club treatment but would have been eligible based 
on individual debt to GDP levels in year T-1. The cumulative average growth for the criteria-eligible group 
T0 and T3 was 11.73%, higher than the non-Paris Club group but below that of the Paris Club treatment 
group. 
 
b. Effect of Paris Club Treatment on Debt to GDP 
 




Average Cumulative change in Debt to 
GDP, T0 to T3: -17.33% 
Average Cumulative change in Debt to 
GDP, T0 to T3: +2.35% 
Note: Figure 16 shows the change in countries’ debt-to-GDP ratios between T-3 and T3 for those receiving 
Paris Club treatment vs. those that did not. On average, countries that received Paris Club treatment saw 
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Similarly, I find significantly improved outcomes when I consider the effect of 
Paris Club treatment on a country’s debt to GDP. I find that, on average, countries 
receiving Paris Club treatment witness a 3-year cumulative reduction in their debt to 
GDP by 17.33%,45 whereas countries that do not receive Paris Club treatment actually 
see their debt increase by an average of 2.35%. As the aim of the Paris Club is to offer 
a package of debt relief to the debtor country, it should be no surprise that receiving 
Paris Club treatment would result in a reduction in a country’s debt stock as well as its 
debt ratios, a finding also supported by Lang, Mihalyi, and Presbitero (2020). It is 
interesting, however, that countries that do not receive this treatment observe a 
continued increase in their debt levels post default (it is important to note that the 
starting levels of debt for these two groups are very different, c. 85% in year T-1 for 
countries that will receive Paris Club treatment, compared to c. 45% for those that do 
not46, 47). These finding suggest that countries that do not receive Paris Club treatment 
are also unlikely to receive substantial debt relief through other channels, i.e., haircuts 
on debt owed to commercial creditors, suggesting that countries receive a benefit 
through Paris Club treatment. When considering the change in the criteria-eligible 
group, I again find that the outcomes are more beneficial than we considering the pure 
non-PC group. Instead of seeing a marginal increase in debt to GDP levels, the criteria-
 
45 This decrease grows to 35.70% if I consider a start date of T-1, perhaps suggesting that debt was 
retroactively reclassified or forgiven. 
46 These are median values. 
47 This raises an important issue regarding the eligibility of countries to receive Paris Club treatment. 
Additional work should be conducted to control for country specific characteristics that would help isolate 
the treatment effect of the Paris Club. 
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eligible group actually shows an average reduction of 5.64% for the period of from T0 to 
T3. 
Figure 17. Debt to GDP, Pre and Post Default, for non-Paris Club Treatment on 
Criteria Eligible Cases 
 
Note: Figure 17 shows the median debt to GDP ratio for the criteria-eligible group of countries between T-
3 and T3. This group did not receive Paris Club treatment but would have been eligible based on individual 
debt to GDP levels in year T-1. The decline in debt to GDP for the criteria-eligible group T0 and T3 was 

















T-3 T-2 T-1 T0 T+1 T+2 T+3





c. Effect of Paris Club Treatment on External Debt Service 
 
Figure 18. External Debt Service, % GDP, Pre and Post Default, Paris Club vs. 
non-Paris Club Treatment 
 
  
Average Cumulative External Debt Sevice 
Paid, %GDP, T0 to T3: 7.66% 
Average Cumulative External Debt 
Sevice Paid, %GDP,  T0 to T3: 8.56% 
Note: Figure 18 shows the change in countries’ external debt service, as a percent of GDP, between T-3 
and T3 for those receiving Paris Club treatment vs. those that did not. On average, countries that received 
Paris Club treatment observed larger declines in external debt service than those that did not. 
 
It should come as no surprise that countries who benefit from large reductions in 
their debt stock, as discussed in the previous section, would also witness a larger 
reduction in their external debt service payments compared to those that did not see 
similar reductions. This change is most stark when one considers the change in 
average external debt service paid in T3 compared to T0. This measure shows a c. 24% 
(% change; 2.14% to 1.67%) reduction for countries receiving Paris Club treatment (this 
figure actually grows to a c. 32% reduction if one compares T3 to T-1; 2.43% to 1.67%) 
compared to a c. 5.3% increase for those that do not. This increase in external debt 
service paid by the non-PC treatment group could reflect the effects of a prolonged 
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base), accrued interest penalties, or other macroeconomic factors that could be 
examined in future research. 
Despite the debt reduction in average debt service paid, the cumulative external 
debt service paid over the period of T0 to T3 is quite similar for both groups; a total of 
7.66% of GDP for those receiving Paris Club treatment compared to 8.56% for those 
that do not. This is largely explained by the heterogeneity of groups (and shown through 
differences in means prior to treatment). While the debt to GDP ratio decreases from a 
median value of c. 86% in T-1 to c. 51% in T3 countries receiving Paris Club treatment, 
this ratio compares similarly to the median debt to GDP ratio of c. 46% for countries not 
receiving treatment, thus explaining similarites in cumulative debt service payments.  
When we consider the path of external debt service on the criteria-eligible group, 
I find that despite a decline in annual debt service payments from T1 to T3, the 
cumulative debt service paid is 8.77% of GDP. This figure is higher than both the group 
receiving Paris Club treament and the non-Paris Club group and is likely driven by 
higher starting levels of debt (as defined by our cutoff criteria for inclusion) and the lack 









Figure 19. External Debt Service (%GDP), Pre and Post Default, for non-Paris Club 
Treatment on Criteria Eligible Cases 
 
Note: Figure 19 shows the median external debt service, in percent of GDP, for the criteria-eligible group 
of countries between T-3 and T3. This group did not receive Paris Club treatment but would have been 
eligible based on individual debt to GDP levels in year T-1. The cumulative external debt service for the 
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d. Effect of Paris Club Treatment on the Current Account Balance 
 
Figure 20. Current Account Balance, % GDP, Pre and Post Default, Paris Club vs 
non-Paris Club Treatment 
 
  
Average Cumulative Current Account 
Balance, %GDP, T0 to T3: -17.96% 
Average Cumulative Current Account 
Balance, %GDP, T0 to T3: -15.12% 
Note: Figure 20 shows the change in countries’ current account balance, as a percent of GDP, between 
T-3 and T3 for those receiving Paris Club treatment vs. those that did not. On average, countries that 
receive Paris Club treatment observed slightly larger current account deficits than those that did not. 
 
When I consider the path of current account balances, in percent of GDP, the 
performance of countries receiving Paris Club treatment compared to those that do not 
is mixed. While median values are negative for both groups over the period of T0 to T3 
(meaning that both groups were, on average, running current account deficits), the 
performance is worse for those receiving Paris Club treatment, witnessing an average 
cumulative current account deficit of 17.96% over this period. This compares to a 
15.12% cumulative deficit for countries not receiving this same treatment. This result 
should not be surprising due to the catalytic role of the IMF as frequently discussed in 
the literature on sovereign restructuring. As Bordo, Mody, and Oomes (2004) and 
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approval” to commerical creditors and can “induce lenders to roll over their credit and, 
hence, prevent an exodus of capital from the country” (Bordo, Mody, and Oomes 2004). 
A secondary, and perhaps perverse, outcome of induced confidence on behalf of 
commercial lenders is that it might encourage excessive lending, especially at times 
when countries should be aiming to reduce their overall debt burdens, at least partially 
through current account improvements. As Bordo, Mody, and Oomes go on to state, 
“IMF lending could also encourage moral hazard, inducing private lenders to be 
careless in their credit decisions in the expectation of being bailed out” (2004), 
ultimately, resulting in concerns of future, or serial, default. 
The path of the current account balance for the criteria-eligible group is actually 
worse than both the Paris Club and non-Paris Club treatment groups, recording an 














Figure 21. Current Account Balance (%GDP), Pre and Post Default, for non-Paris 
Club Treatment on Criteria Eligible Cases 
 
 
Note: Figure 21 shows the median current account balance, in percent of GDP, for the criteria-eligible 
group of countries between T-3 and T3. This group did not receive Paris Club treatment but would have 
been eligible based on individual debt to GDP levels in year T-1. The cumulative average current account 
deficit for the criteria-eligible group T0 and T3 was 22.47%, higher than both the non-Paris Club and Paris 
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e. Effect of Paris Club Treatment on the Primary Fiscal Balance 
 
Figure 22. Primary Fiscal Balance % GDP, Pre and Post Default, Paris Club vs 
non-Paris Club Treatment 
 
  
Average Cumulative Primary Fiscal 
Balance, %GDP, T0 to T3: -2.71% 
Average Cumulative Primary Fiscal 
Balance, %GDP, T0 to T3: -3.25% 
Note: Figure 22 shows the change in countries’ primary fiscal balance, as a percent of GDP, between T-3 
and T3 for those receiving Paris Club treatment vs. those that do not. On average, countries that receive 
Paris Club treatment witness slightly larger primary fiscal deficits than those that do not. 
 
Given the necessary involvement of the IMF through “an appropriate IMF-
supported program” in order for a country to receive treatment from the Paris Club 
(Buchheit et al. 2019; Imam 2008), one would expect to find significant improvements in 
a country’s primary fiscal balance, as the IMF has historically placed significant 
emphasis on fiscal consolidation in order to resolve debt issues (Baum, Poplawski-
Ribeiro, and Weber 2012; Estevao and Samake 2013). While it is true that over the 
period of T0 to T3, the average primary fiscal balance of countries receiving Paris Club 
treatment is indeed better than those that do not, -2.71% compared to -3.25%, this 
amount is slightly skewed due to the strong performance by PC treatment countries in 
year T0 (perhaps in order to appease creditors in order to be eligible for treatment). In 
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and simultaneously extend the sample to T5, the comparative performance of these two 
groups invert, showing that countries receiving Paris Club treatment saw a cumulative 
average primary fiscal balance of -4.17% compared to -3.36% for those that did not. A 
cynical explanation for this phenomenon might be that countries are no longer forced to 
undergo politically challenging fiscal consolidation/austerity measures once they have 
already received the prize of debt relief (De Mesquita 2011). An alternative explanation 
for these results might stem from the fact that countries that receive debt relief are not 
forced to rely solely on fiscal consolidation as a means of reducing their debt ratios and 
are thus free to use fiscal policy as a tool to aimed at development and growth oriented 
policies. As found by Clements, Gupta, and Nozaki (2011), this is indeed what occurred 
in IMF supported countries, which see an increase in both education and health 
spending.  
The path of the primary fiscal balance for the criteria-eligible group is actually 
better than both the Paris Club and non-Paris Club treatment groups for both the period 
of T0 to T3 and T-1 to T3, recording average cumulative primary fiscal deficits of 1.57% 










Figure 23. Primary Fiscal Balance (%GDP), Pre and Post Default, for non-Paris 
Club Treatment on Criteria Eligible Cases 
 
Note: Figure 23 shows the median primary fiscal balance, in percent of GDP, for the criteria-eligible group 
of countries between T-3 and T3. This group did not receive Paris Club treatment but would have been 
eligible based on individual debt to GDP levels in year T-1. The cumulative average primary fiscal deficit 
for the criteria-eligible group T0 and T3 was 1.57%, lower than both the non-Paris Club and Paris Club 
treatment groups. 
 
Stylized Facts of Macroeconomic Outcomes of Paris Club Treatment 
 
Ultimately, as a result of these findings, it is hard to conclude that countries that 
receive Paris Club treatment are definitively better off. While it is true that the reduction 
in debt stock appears substantially greater under this treatment (and subsequently 
appears to result in higher growth levels, perhaps linked to a higher degree of fiscal 
space resulting from reduced debt service payments), the remaining variables that I 
considered show an ambiguous outcome at best. This finding is further confirmed when 
we consider the path of the criteria-eligible set of countries that one might expect to 
perform the worst due to a high starting level of debt while also not qualifying for Paris 
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performing outcomes when considering the path of the primary fiscal balance to falling 
between the Paris Club and non-Paris Club treatment groups for both real GDP growth 
and decline in debt to GDP ratios.  
Furthermore, when considering the different outcomes between the Paris Club 
treatment group and the non-treatment group, the lack of improvement in the primary 
fiscal balance of countries receiving treatment likely has the effect that there is a welfare 
gain for its citizens as a result of lesser austerity measures than perhaps expected.48 
This additional domestic spending would likely result in increased growth as previously 
discussed, ultimately benefiting the populace (Leigh, Pescatori, and Guajardo 2011; 
Blanchard and Leigh 2013). However, the lack of improvement in either the primary 
fiscal balance or the current account balance, while providing a short-term welfare gain 
for the country, might induce a behavioral effect that results in future negative outcomes 
as a result of delaying required policy action. In extreme cases, these findings are likely 
to represent the performance of countries receiving treatment in return for assurances 
of future policy adjustments that do not materialize. The immediate benefits of 
witnessing a large debt stock reduction and subsequent delays in policy action could 





48 The result of debt relief, in effect, is that the cost of policy adjustment is borne partly by external 
creditors, rather than solely by the debtor’s populace. 
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IV. Has Debt Restructuring via the Paris Club Prevented Serial Default? 
 
The primary aim of the Paris Club is to find ‘sustainable solutions’ and to aid 
debtor countries in undertaking “reforms to stabilize and restore their macroeconomic 
and financial situation” (Club de Paris n.d.). By definition, any sustainable solution to the 
difficulties faced by debtor countries will include the aim of preventing a subsequent 
default. While current literature on sovereign default (IMF 2015c; Buchheit et al. 2019; 
Roos 2019) includes frequent mention of: the Paris Club, Paris Club treatments, or the 
workings of the Paris Club, there appears to be a lack of empirical analysis done to date 
on whether or not Paris Club treatments on debtor countries have actually resulted in 
positive outcomes. In the previous section I considered the impact that Paris Club 
treatment has on various macroeconomic indicators; however, the ultimate marker of 
whether these effects have positive outcomes is whether they aid debtor countries in 
avoiding subsequent defaults, a.k.a. serial defaults. Using the aforementioned dataset 
on sovereign default and distress episodes as well as the data I have gathered on Paris 
Club treatments, I have conducted a second round of analysis attempting to answer this 
important question. After separating defaults that were recorded as a result of Paris 
Club treatment and those that resulted from non-Paris Club treatment, I was able to 
consider whether the countries experienced a subsequent default (Start of Default) or 
distress (Start of Distress) events within either the next 5- or 10-year periods. Out of a 
total of 156 observations of default recorded as a result of Paris Club treatment, I found 
47 cases of subsequent default occurring within 5 years of the initial treatment, 94 
 
87 
episodes occurring within 10 years;49 50 episodes of new distress occurring within the 
first 5 years of the initial treatment, and 114 episodes occurring within 10 years. Next, I 
considered non-Paris Club defaults.50 Out of a total of 493 observations, I found 141 
cases of subsequent default occurring within 5 years of the initial treatment, 292 
episodes occurring within 10 years; 140 episodes of new distress occurring within the 
first 5 years of the initial treatment, and 282 episodes occurring within 10 years.51 The 























49 Where the 5-year set is a strict sub-set of the 10-year set (for both default and distress), i.e., a total of 
94 10-year observations result in a net increase of 47 additional default observations that occurred 
between year 6 and 10. The fact that this amount is exactly double the number of 5-year observations is 
purely coincidental. 
50 As in the previous section, non-Paris Club defaults are defaults that were recorded from events other 
than Paris Club treatment and do not contain any PC treatment that occurred within +/− 2 years of the 
recorded default.  
51 It is important to note that start of default episodes are not a strict subset of start of distress episodes 
as countries might remain ‘in distress’ but not ‘in default’ following default, thus precluding a ‘start of 
distress’ from being recorded, however, not preclude a ‘start of default’ observation. 
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Figure 24. Incidence of Serial Default/Distress Following Initial Default, Paris Club 
and non-Paris Club Treatment. 
 
 
Note: Figure 24 shows the percent of serial default and distress episodes observed in countries that 
receive Paris Club treatment vs. those that do not over a 5- and 10-year period following default. In each 
of the four categories, countries that receive Paris Club treatment observe a higher incidence of serial 
default and distress episodes. 
Source: Dielmann Default Data. 
 
 
From the Chart, I observe that countries receiving Paris Club treatment actually 
faced a higher likelihood of witnessing subsequent episodes of both default and distress 
at the 5- and 10-year period. Notwithstanding the aforementioned differences in 
selection of countries that do and do not receive Paris Club treatment, these results 
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of the Paris Club. Additionally, these results support the earlier discussion that large 
reductions in debt stock can result in avoiding necessary policy adjustments, particularly 
regarding the primary fiscal balance, to prevent subsequent defaults. Even in the 
absence of comparison across groups, the high observation of subsequent default and 
distress events, of 60.3% and 73.1% respectively, recorded within a 10-year period of 
receiving both debt relief and an IMF supported lending program should be considered 




















Given the results of the regression models and sample statistics, this thesis finds 
that, to date, there do not appear to be any statistically significant measures showing 
that an increase in Chinese lending has led to higher incidence of distress episodes for 
borrower countries. While this result may appear surprising at first take, a number of 
factors needed to be considered in order to frame this conclusion.  
First, while I have a measure of both total debt as well as debt to owed to China, 
it appears that the likelihood of observing a distress event is determined less by the 
identity of creditors and more by a country’s total amount of debt. If this is indeed the 
case, then the question becomes how much countries that have borrowed from China 
would have borrowed otherwise, i.e., the counter-factual scenario. Without being able to 
control for the degree of substitution between creditors that occurred for borrowing 
countries, it will be impossible to answer this question. As previously mentioned, 
Chinese lending to Africa on an annual basis peaked in 2013, coinciding with the launch 
of the Belt and Road Initiative, and has been declining since (Acker and Bräutigam 
2021). This finding provides at least some evidence that debtor countries have been 
able to fill their financing gap with borrowing from sources other than China. 
A second question addressed was whether there is something inherently unique 
about Chinese lending that, without regard to the total amount in US$ or as a percent of 
the borrower’s GDP, makes a country more or less likely to default. As previously noted, 
Chinese lending does have a few unique characteristics involving both the creditor 
classification, i.e., whether they will be classified as either official or commercial lending, 
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a lack of transparency resulting from included non-disclosure agreements (Malpass 
2020), as well as the inclusion of express ‘no Paris Club’ or ‘comparability of treatment’ 
clauses (Gelpern et al. 2021). While these factors are problematic, for a host of reasons 
discussed, recent events suggest that they might be less drastic than once feared. For 
one, in regard to creditor classification, although both China Development Bank (CDB) 
and the Industrial and Commercial Bank of China (ICBC) were classified as commercial 
creditors and thus fell outside of the scope of the G20’s Debt Service Suspension 
Initiative, China was willing to restructure the loans of both creditors in the case of 
Angola (See Box 2; IMF 2021a). Furthermore, as a signatory to the G20’s Common 
Framework that requires equal burden sharing as well as transparency of claims, China 
has further shown a willingness to engage within the international financial architecture 
to pursue joint solutions for debt relief despite its historic desire to pursue bilateral 
solutions (Acker, Bräutigam, and Huang 2020). This development could, de facto, 
negate China’s ability to enforce prior contractual obligations – “confidentiality” and “no 
Paris Club” clauses - signed by debtor countries that prevent disclosure and 
comparability of treatment (Gelpern et al. 2021), both of which stand in direct contrast to 
the DSSI and the Common Framework. However, the framework’s intent to handle debt 
treatments on a case-by-case basis will continue to allow China to retain the ability to 
unilaterally determine which creditors will or will not be included in any restructurings, 
creating further tension between the official and private sector. 
A lack of transparency regarding China’s lending does remain an issue not only 
for private creditors who are thus unable to properly price the risk of the borrowing 
country’s commercial debt, but also for official creditors, that require a clear 
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understanding of a country’s true liabilities in order to design both a package of debt 
relief as well as an IMF program in order to restore the debtor country to debt and fiscal 
sustainability. The case of the Republic of Congo is serving as an important test case. It 
appears so far that when a deep restructuring of a country’s liabilities is needed, China 
is indeed willing to work with international partners and provide transparency, at least to 
the degree that their claims are centrally known (Gulde 2018). The opacity of 
outstanding claims is perhaps likely less a danger in the form of designing an 
incomplete package of relief as in leading to a delay in which this package is delivered. 
This was also reflected in the case of Zambia.  
This thesis also finds that the macroeconomic outcomes of countries receiving 
Paris Club treatment compared to those that do not are mixed. While we do witness 
significant reductions in debt stocks associated with treatment as well as improved 
growth figures, the effect on the primary fiscal balance and current account balance of 
debtor countries is both less beneficial and less conclusive as determined by means 
and variance tests. Additionally, the higher observed incidence of both default and 
distress episodes following Paris Club treatment suggests that the current system is not 
sufficient in preventing serial default or inducing the required country behavior to ensure 
medium- to long-term sustainability. This should serve as further evidence to suggest 
that if China were willing to accept membership into the Paris Club, it would not result in 
the resolution of all concerns that have been raised about China’s growing presence 
within the sovereign lending landscape. To put this more succinctly, an enlargement of 
Paris Club membership alone is unlikely to serve as a panacea for avoiding future 
sovereign defaults.  
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Based upon this discussion, this thesis finds that despite a lack of transparency 
and the inclusion of strict anti-collaborative provisions within Chinese lending contracts, 
their use has not led to a systematic increase in sovereign distress episodes. This 
ultimately support the work of Bräutigam and Rithmire that claims of China’s ‘debt-trap 




















VI. Discussion on Steps for Further Research 
 
In this thesis, I have attempted to isolate the effect that additional Chinese 
lending has on the likelihood that a country will be in a state of distress. In order to do 
so, I have tested whether two variables on Chinese lending (those being the Log of 
Debt owed to China in US$ and Debt owed to China as a percent of the borrower’s 
GDP) in my regression models are shown to have any statistical significance in 
predicting distress events when compared to regression models without these variables. 
I have, however, left the binary dependent variables (those being ii) In Distress and iv) 
Start of Distress unchanged. To further examine the effect that Chinese lending has, I 
propose repeating the previous exercise by amending the dependent variable to include 
additional incidence of distress where China agreed to pursue loan modifications 
(including restructuring, reprofiling, or refinancing). In order to do this, I have created an 









Table 10. Data Sources on Chinese Loan Modifications 
Note: Table 10 shows all sources of Chinese loan modifications used to create the merged dataset. This 
data is not used in my statistical analysis of Chinese lending but could be used to modify the dependent 
binary variable ‘In Distress’ in future analysis. 
 
This dataset contains 140 observations of remodification of loan terms with 
Chinese creditors that could be classified as distress events. The addition of these 
observations within the dependent dummy variable might result in additional 
significance of Chinese lending when testing using the four logistic regression models, 
particularly in cases where the predicted probability, p, is low. It is important to note, 
however, that 68 of these observed cases were already recorded as distress event in 
my dataset. As a result, the addition of this dataset leads to a net increase of 72 distress 
observations. While outside the scope of this thesis, additional research could be 
conducted, likely via case studies, on the already included 68 observations, looking 
specifically at whether the distress occurred as a result of modification on Chinese 
loans, or if these modifications occurred as a result of distress the country was 
independently experiencing.  
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Limitations on Chinese Lending Data 
 
There are a number of important factors to note when interpreting the prior 
results, the first being that the observed data on Chinese lending is relatively young 
compared to data that have been collected on sovereign defaults/distress events as well 
as other macroeconomic data (those being used as independent and control variables 
in my models). This results in two outcomes, the first is that a significant number of 
observations from the initial balanced panel of 9,843 CountryYear observations is 
dropped for years in which I do not have data on Chinese lending. While the remaining 
dataset is sufficiently large for measurement, the number of usable observations should 
continue to grow in lockstep with the growth of data on Chinese lending, thus continuing 
to strengthen the results of any model tasked with determining causality of the variables 
of interest. 
Another issue relates to the accuracy of the data being used to measure Chinese 
lending. I have opted to use the ‘Chinese Overseas Lending’ dataset that was produced 
by Horn, Reinhart, and Trebesch, hereafter ‘HRT’, (2019). The reason that I have done 
so is that, to date, it is the only available data source that aggregates various 
independent sources to create a dataset of global coverage. While in some instances 
alternate datasets contain a more detailed breakdown of Chinese lending, especially in 
regard to loan level data (such as a SAIS CARI52 and AidData,53 etc.), these datasets 
were not useable for my work as their country coverage is simply not sufficiently 
 
52 See SAIS China Africa Research Initiative. “Loan Data.”  




comprehensive. Additionally, I was apprehensive of using various datasets to create a 
merged dataset as I would not be able to guarantee that collection methodologies used 
by various authors would be not sufficiently similar for use in a statistical application. 
 The HRT dataset has also received various criticism from other authors, 
specifically from the team at SAIS CARI (Bräutigam and Acker 2020) regarding the 
accuracy of the loan data, specifically that the HRT Dataset relied on ‘contracted’ rather 
than disbursed loans. While this distinction may seem trivial and esoteric at first glance, 
the implications of this distinction could actually result in significant differences. 
Contracted debt refers to the total amount of debt that the creditor agrees to lend to the 
borrower, i.e., if China agrees to lend US$ 1 bln. to a debtor country over a ten-year 
period, the contracted amount would then be US$ 1 bln. If, however, the debtor country 
only winds up borrowing a fraction of this amount, say US$ 250 mln., this would refer to 
the disbursement amount, i.e., the amount that the debtor country actually received. 
The statistical implications of US$ 1 bln. vs. US$ 250 mln., might be trivial in some 
cases while significant in others, especially in regard to the likelihood that a country 
finds itself in default. HRT have responded to this criticism and have actually suggested 
that their findings, despite relying on contracted sums, are likely to represent a lower 
bound of the actual amount of borrowing that countries have received from China (Horn, 
Reinhart, and Trebesch 2020). While I am not in a position to judge the merits of either 
claim, I certainly acknowledge that, in addition to the opacity surrounding Chinese loan 
terms, there is also opacity in regard to which numbers one should use to measure it. 
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With this potential shortfall noted, there are two possible effects that 
discrepancies in the HRT data could pose. The first is a form of ex-ante or expectation 
about the effect that additional lending would have, i.e., one might expect that it is in fact 
the disbursement of debt, rather than the contracting of debt, that would result in a 
country finding itself in debt distress. This would be the case if one believed that a 
country’s additional debt service payments resulting from Chinse borrowing, occurring 
at the margin, are the straw that broke its back in terms of solvency. The ex-post, or 
after the default, response to this might be, however, that if one observed a country that 
did find itself in distress, and one were unable to find any statistical significance to 
suggest that the contracted Chinese lending (the upper bound value of the two) played 
a part, then one would assume that a lesser amount of disbursed debt would have 
resulted in even lower significance. Ultimately, without comprehensive data available for 
comparison purposes, it will be impossible to determine the true impact that this 
discrepancy in data might cause in terms of over or under attributing significance to 
Chinese lending. 
Default vs. Distress 
In this thesis, I have only considered ‘distress’ observations rather than ‘default’ 
observations, as my dataset contains significantly more observations of being in 
distress rather than being in default (2,877 vs 1,675). While the larger number of 
positive observations provide a stronger ‘signal,’ it would likely produce a more reliable 
cutoff criterion if using a standard Noise-to-Signal approach. As I am testing total 
predictive power using the AUC, however, there would be no reason to assume that 
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distress rather than default variables would produce stronger results. These models 
could be rerun using the ‘default’ dummies (‘In Default’ and ‘Start of Default’) rather than 
dummies on ‘distress’. 
Number of Lags 
As previously discussed, I am currently employing a 1-year lag of my 
independent variables to test for whether a country will be in distress or witness the start 
of a distress event. In conversation with the IMF’s Strategy, Policy and Review 
Department, however, I have learned that their recent early-warning indicator model 
employs a forecast window of 2 years, rather than a point-wise forecast horizon.54 
Preliminary testing suggests that the inclusion of a second lagged term for each 
independent variable does lead to an increase in total predictive power of the models as 




As previously discussed, for any CountryYear observation in which arrears 
become present or where there is an increase arrears by a factor for 2 or greater, this is 
considered as being a start of distress observation.55 The factor of 2X was chosen to 
 
54 Interview conducted with the IMF’s Strategy, Policy and Review Department regarding the “Review of 
The Debt Sustainability Framework For Market Access Countries” on February 10, 2021 (IMF Strategy, 
Policy and Review Department, 2021). 
55 By definition, any observed default observation will necessarily also be considered a start of distress 
episode where the binary dependent variable ‘In Distress’ will also be set equal to 1. The CountryYear 
observation will also be considered as being in distress and in default (with ‘In Distress’ and ‘In Default’ 
being equal to 1). 
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capture non-insignificant increases of arrears scaled to the existing level of arrears 
normalized relative to each country’s size of outstanding arrears at the time of increase. 
Regarding the two rules that govern the coding of ‘Start of Default’, the first rule 
is likely quite intuitive in that a default should be recorded when a country begins to run 
arrears; legally obligated payments were missed, thus a default occurred. The latter 
rule, regarding the doubling over previous year’s arrears, is likely less intuitive. The 
reason that this has been coded as such is to capture new arrears that result from a 
new observation of missed payment. When considering the dataset, it is quite clear that 
once a country begins to run arrears, they are likely to remain in arrears for a number of 
years until a resolution can be found and the arrears can be cleared. In fact, the most 
common pattern within in the data is that arrears are zero until a default occurs, arrears 
then become present, and then decline over the next period of years as arrears are paid 
off/cleared. As discussed, the presence of these arrears indicates a specific vulnerability 
of the observed CountryYear, in that the country is still indebted following missed 
payments. However, one should not view each year in which arrears are present as 
suggesting that a Country is in either default or distress, especially if the outstanding 
arears balance is being cleared following an agreed upon payment schedule. 
Additionally, small increases in the outstanding arrears balance should also not be 
considered new episodes of default or distress as it is likely the case that these 
increases are the result of the country accruing interest penalties on their arrears 
balance. If, however, one witnessed the outstanding balance of arrears increasing by a 
significant amount, then one could conclude that this occurred as a result of additional 
missed payments rather than simple penalty accruals. It is thus likely that these 
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observations represent a new and unique episode of default. It is important to note, 
however, that in order for these observations to be considered new default observations 
within my merged Default Dataset, it may also be the case the country was neither in 
distress nor in default within the 2 previous years. 
 
How could these models be Strengthened?  
 
With so many questions faced in the economic and social sciences, the ability to 
accurately address them is often constrained by data availability. As previously noted, 
my dataset began as a strongly balanced panel consisting of Country and Year 
observations between 1970 and 2020, resulting in 9,843 observations. However, an 
equal number of data series of relevant covariates are not available for this entire time 
period. For example, the IMF’s WEO (2020b) database begins in 1980, UN ILO data on 
unemployment begins in 1990 (n.d.), and the HRT data on Chinese lending begins in 
2000 (2020). When I combine the limitations of these series as well as missing 
observations, being the most common in low-income and developing countries where 
data collection can be challenging, I am left with 2,717 observations, slightly less than 
30% of the initial number of observations. Another challenge is that many potentially 
relevant datasets are only available for sub-samples of all countries. The World Bank’s 
International Debt Statistics dataset (IDS; 2020), for example, contains an impressive 
collection of variables seemingly relevant for this work, including data on debt service 
payments, total debt, total external debt etc. all broken down by creditor type. The issue, 
however, is that its data is only available for low-income countries, thus excluding many 
emerging and advanced markets, including many episodes from noted serial defaulters 
 
102 
such as Argentina and Chile, as well as more prominent observations such as Russia 
(1998) or Greece (2015). Another dataset that would likely serve as useful control 
variables is the World Bank’s Country Policy and Institutional Assessment (CPIA) 
database (World Bank 2019). This database and rating methodology assigns scores 
based on countries’ assessed strength of public sector management, institutions, and 
governance, in particular, topics that rate countries’ strength in economic and debt 
management. As with the IDS dataset, however, CPIA ratings are only available for IDA 
eligible countries,56 thus making them impossible to use as a universal control variable 
across the entire sample. 
The inverse of this issue is true when constructing my dataset on default/distress 
observations. The latest guidance note on the IMF’s MAC DSA Review (2021c) includes 
a list of 482 distress events featuring 77 countries between 1990 and 2007. However, 
this sample only includes ‘market access countries’ (MAC), being defined as countries 
that are not PRGT eligible, thus excluding the 67 poorest countries (IMF 2021c).57 
Unfortunately, the 2017 review of the LIC DSF does not make public the list of distress 
events used in its probit estimation (IMF 2017). 
One variable that is frequently cited, particularly in the private sector, as being a 
metric of risk is bond yields. I have intentionally decided to omit yields from my dataset 
for two reasons; the first being that I am considering all episodes of sovereign distress 
or default, including those that do not stem from bond defaults as well as from countries 
that have not issued bonds, such as low-income countries that might rely on official 
 
56 See Appendix for list of all IDA eligible countries (World Bank n.d.). 
57 See Appendix for a list of all PRGT eligible countries (IMF 2021d). 
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lending. Bond yields fundamentally represent an additional dependent variable, i.e., 
being dependent on fundamental factors such as the independent variables already 
used throughout my model. As bond yields change in real-time, resulting from the 
market’s response to their perception of underlying changes in country fundamentals, it 
represents a reactionary rather than predictive variable and potentially leads to reverse 
causality issues. However, it would be possible to propose additional research using a 
multi-stage model: first determining the relationship between yields and default, then 
running a linear pooled OLS regression using a host of independent explanatory 
variables on the yields, and finally using predicted Yhat values as a measure of default. 
This method might provide a few statistical advantages, such as using linear predictors, 
ignoring the effect of compressions (Berry, DeMeritt, and Esarey 2010), or the ability to 
control for heteroskedasticity. However, these benefits are likely to be offset by an 
additional data challenge - that being that bond yields are readily obtainable from 
sources such as Bloomberg on daily frequency, while other independent variables are 
likely only available on an annual basis (WEO, IDS, ILO, etc.). This difference in 
reporting period could be partially corrected by annualizing yield data through simple 
averaging; however, this would result in the loss of the timely response that yield data 
can provide. A more beneficial improvement would be to shorten the collection period of 
the included independent variables. Some national statistical agencies, primarily those 
located in higher-income advanced economies, already report certain macroeconomic 
data on a quarterly basis, such as GDP growth, inflation, unemployment, etc. This, 
however, brings us back to the earlier problem that many datasets are only available for 
subsets of countries. Thus, until there is a global push for more rapid and 
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comprehensive data collection, it is unlikely that researchers will overcome these 
particular challenges. 
Additional research could be considered using alternative model specifications. 
One such model that could be considered for further research might be to use a 
Poisson regression model that uses categorical dependent variables rather than binary 
dependents. As previously discussed, the reason that I have opted for the use of a 
logistic regression model is due to the fact that my dependent variable is a binary 
categorical variable, i.e., 0 in the case of no distress and 1 in the case of distress. If, 
however, a new dataset could be created that were able to assign rank to differing 
degrees of distress, e.g., 0 for no distress, 1 for in distress, 2 for loss of market access, 
3 for in technical default, 4 for in full default, etc., other types of regression models could 
be employed. In this case, a Poisson model would be more appropriate than a logistic 
model. I will refrain from speculating whether this would provide additional statistical 













Equation 2. Derivation of the Logistic Regression Model 
 
Logistic regression models differ from linear regression models in that they 
regress a series of independent variables onto binary response variables, such that Y 
will be equal to 1 when the observation of interest is ‘true’ and equal to 0 when ‘false’. In 
the dataset, these response to the binary dummy variables ‘In Distress’ and ‘Start of 
Distress’ which are equal to 1 in CountryYear observations in which a country was 
either in distress or I record the onset of a distress event.58 The model then assumes 
that the log-odds ratio of K observation as a linear function of x. 







Where b is the coefficient on the independent variable x, for all j, and Sigma, 𝛴, is the 
sum of the subsequent factors. 
Taking the exponent of both sides of the expression yields: 
 
(2)         
𝑃(𝑥)
1−𝑝(𝑥)
= 𝑒 [∑ 𝑏𝑗𝑥𝑗
𝐾
𝑗=0





Where e is the exponent function and Pi, 𝛱, is the product of the subsequent factors. 














Where the function is bounded by 𝑃(−∞) = 0 and 𝑃(∞) = 1. Hence, as z approaches 
negative infinity, the numerator of this expression will equal to approach 0 and the 
denominator will approach 1+0=1. Hence, the value of the function as z approaches 
negative infinity will be 0.  
Where the expression 
ⅇ(𝑧)
1+ⅇ(𝑧)
 is the sigmoid function of (z), and is bounded by the earlier 
limits of 0 and 1. 
Rewriting this expression as 
(5)          𝑝(𝑧) =
ⅇ(𝑧)
1+ⅇ(𝑧)
= 𝑒(𝑧) ⋅ (1 + 𝑒(𝑧))
−1
 
And then taking the derivative of P (chain rule) results in: 
(6) 𝑃′(𝑧) = 𝑒(𝑧) ⋅ (1 + 𝑒(𝑧))
−1




























(10) = (𝑃(𝑧))(1 − 𝑃(𝑧)) 
Unlike linear regression models that fit the slope of the regression line using the 
ordinary least squares methodology, logistic regressions rely on maximum likelihood 
estimators of N individual observations.59 
(11) 𝐿(𝑋|𝑃) = ∏ 𝑃(𝑥𝑖)
𝑁
𝑖=1,𝑦1=1




 Where (X, y) is the observation set, X is a K+1 by N matrix of inputs, where each 
column responds to an observation 
(12) 𝐿(𝑋|𝑃) = ⅈ = ∑ 𝑙𝑛𝑃(𝑥𝑖)
𝑁



















Where Del, 𝛻, denotes the partial derivatives of L with respect to b. 
Given that 𝑝′ = 𝑝(1 − 𝑝𝑖), this can then be rewritten as: 






























(16) = ∑ (1 − 𝑃1)𝑥𝑖
𝑁




59 Logistic regressions do not have residuals as they aim to maximize likelihood by minimizing deviation 
rather than the minimization of the residual sum of squares. 
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(17) = ∑ (𝑦𝑖(1 − 𝑃𝑖) − (1 − 𝑦𝑖)𝑃𝑖)𝑥𝑖
𝑁
𝑖=1  
Row 17 combines the earlier expressions into a single sum for both yi=0 and yi=1. After 
cancelling terms, one can maximize the expression by setting the simultaneous 
equations equal to 0, which results in: 
(18) ∑ 𝑦𝑖𝑥𝑖
𝑁
𝑖=1 − 𝑃𝑖𝑥𝑖 = 0 





− 𝑃1𝑥𝑖𝑗 = 0 
(20) = ∑ 𝑦𝑖
𝑁
𝑖=1,𝑥𝑖𝑗=1
− 𝑃1 = 0 
 







This final expression represents the summed probability of the marginal 
contributions of all xi, which will be equal to the total number of ‘true’ responses, 
where Y = 1. 
Solving for the coefficients: 
Given a vector with value equal to 𝑓: 𝑦 = 𝑓(𝑏), I begin by solving for the value of b when 
𝑓(𝑏) = 0. 
(1) 𝑓(𝑏0 + 𝛥) ≈ 𝑓(𝑏0) + 𝑓
′(𝑏0)𝛥 
Solving for delta, 𝛥: 






Where f is the gradient of the log-likelihood and is Jacobian matrix of the first derivative 
of f, with respect to b. It then follows that:  























(8) ≡ 𝑋𝑊𝑋𝑇 
Where W is the diagonal matrix of the derivative of P’i. Solving for 𝛥 at each iteration of i 
results in: 
(9) 𝛥𝑘 = (𝑋𝑊𝑘𝑋
𝑇)−1𝑋(𝑦 − 𝑃𝑘) 
Where W is the matrix, y is the vector of observed responses, and Pk is the vector of 
















































































































































Ln Total Reserves, U














































































































Ln of Debt to China, U









Debt to China, %



















































































Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Figure 31. Area Under the Receiver Operating Characteristic Curve (AUC); 1970-
2020 with and without Chinese Lending, against ‘In Distress’ 
 
 
Pooled Logitistic Model, 1970-2020 Pooled Logitistic Model, 1970-2020 with 
Chinese Lending 
  




Fixed Effects Logitistic Model, 1970-2020 Fixed Effects Logitistic Model, 1970-2020 
with Chinese Lending 
  











Figure 32. Area Under the Receiver Operating Characteristic Curve (AUC); 1970-
2020 with and without Chinese Lending, against ‘In Distress’ 
 
 
Random Effects Logitistic Model, 1970-
2020 
Random Effects Logitistic Model, 1970-
2020 with Chinese Lending 
  




Mixed Effects Logitistic Model, 1970-2020 Mixed Effects Logitistic Model, 1970-2020 
with Chinese Lending 
  











Figure 33. Area Under the Receiver Operating Characteristic Curve (AUC); 1970-
2008 with and without Chinese Lending, against ‘In Distress’ 
 
 








Fixed Effects Logitistic Model, 1970-2008 Fixed Effects Logitistic Model, 1970-2008 
with Chinese Lending 
 
 











Figure 34. Area Under the Receiver Operating Characteristic Curve (AUC); 1970-
2008 with and without Chinese Lending, against ‘In Distress’ 
 
 
Random Effects Logitistic Model, 1970-
2008 
Random Effects Logitistic Model, 1970-
2008 with Chinese Lending 
  




Mixed Effects Logitistic Model, 1970-2008 Mixed Effects Logitistic Model, 1970-
2008 with Chinese Lending 
  











Figure 35. Area Under the Receiver Operating Characteristic Curve (AUC); 2009-
2020 with and without Chinese Lending, against ‘In Distress’ 
 
 
Pooled Logitistic Model, 2009-2020 Pooled Logitistic Model, 2009-2020 with 
Chinese Lending 
  




Fixed Effects Logitistic Model, 2009-2020 Fixed Effects Logitistic Model, 2009-2020 
with Chinese Lending 
  








Figure 36. Area Under the Receiver Operating Characteristic Curve (AUC); 2009-
2020 with and without Chinese Lending, against ‘In Distress’ 
 
 
Random Effects Logitistic Model, 2009-
2020 
Random Effects Logitistic Model, 2009-
2020 with Chinese Lending 
  




Mixed Effects Logitistic Model, 2009-2020 Mixed Effects Logitistic Model, 2009-2020 
with Chinese Lending 
  









Figure 37. Area Under the Receiver Operating Characteristic Curve (AUC); 1970-
2020 with and without Chinese Lending, against ‘Start of Distress’ 
 
 
Pooled Logitistic Model, 1970-2020 Pooled Logitistic Model, 1970-2020 with 
Chinese Lending 
  




Fixed Effects Logitistic Model, 1970-2020 Fixed Effects Logitistic Model, 1970-2020 
with Chinese Lending 
  











Figure 38. Area Under the Receiver Operating Characteristic Curve (AUC); 1970-
2020 with and without Chinese Lending, against ‘Start of Distress’ 
 
 
Random Effects Logitistic Model, 1970-
2020 
Random Effects Logitistic Model, 1970-
2020 with Chinese Lending 
  




Mixed Effects Logitistic Model, 1970-2020 Mixed Effects Logitistic Model, 1970-2020 
with Chinese Lending 
  











Figure 39. Area Under the Receiver Operating Characteristic Curve (AUC); 1970-
2008 with and without Chinese Lending, against ‘Start of Distress’ 
 
 
Pooled Logitistic Model, 1970-2008 Pooled Logitistic Model, 1970-2008 with 
Chinese Lending 
  
AUC: 72.08% AUC: 72.35% 
 
 
Fixed Effects Logitistic Model, 1970-2020 Fixed Effects Logitistic Model, 1970-2020 
with Chinese Lending 
  












Figure 40. Area Under the Receiver Operating Characteristic Curve (AUC); 1970-
2008 with and without Chinese Lending, against ‘Start of Distress’ 
 
 
Random Effects Logitistic Model, 1970-
2020 
Random Effects Logitistic Model, 1970-
2020 with Chinese Lending 
  




Mixed Effects Logitistic Model, 1970-2020 Mixed Effects Logitistic Model, 1970-2020 
with Chinese Lending 
  











Figure 41. Area Under the Receiver Operating Characteristic Curve (AUC); 2009-
2020 with and without Chinese Lending, against ‘Start of Distress’ 
 
 
Pooled Logitistic Model, 2009-2020 Pooled Logitistic Model, 2009-2020 with 
Chinese Lending 
  




Fixed Effects Logitistic Model, 2009-2020 Fixed Effects Logitistic Model, 2009-2020 
with Chinese Lending 
  









Figure 42. Area Under the Receiver Operating Characteristic Curve (AUC); 2009-
2020 with and without Chinese Lending, against ‘Start of Distress’ 
 
 
Random Effects Logitistic Model, 2009-
2020 
Random Effects Logitistic Model, 2009-
2020 with Chinese Lending 
  




Mixed Effects Logitistic Model, 2009-2020 Mixed Effects Logitistic Model, 2009-2020 
with Chinese Lending 
  
















Source: Center for Global Development (Hurley, Morris, and Portelance 2019) 
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Table 12. List of IMF Low-Income Countries (PRGT Eligible), as of January 31, 
2021 
 
Source: IMF 2021d. 
 
Country Risk of debt distress 1/ Country Risk of debt distress 1/
Afghanistan High Maldives High
Bangladesh Low Mali  Moderate
Benin Moderate Marshall Islands High
Bhutan Moderate Mauritania High
Burkina Faso Moderate Micronesia High
Burundi   High Moldova 3/ Low
Cambodia Low Mozambique In debt distress
Cameroon 3/ High Myanmar Low
Cabo Verde  3/ High Nepal   Low
Central African Republic High Nicaragua Moderate
Chad   High Niger Moderate
Comoros Moderate Papua New Guinea  3/ High
Congo, Democratic Republic of Moderate Rwanda Moderate
Congo, Republic of 3/ In debt distress Samoa High
Côte d'Ivoire Moderate São Tomé and Príncipe  In debt distress
Djibouti High Senegal Moderate
Dominica  3/ High Sierra Leone High
Eritrea … Solomon Islands Moderate
Ethiopia High Somalia In debt distress
Gambia, The High South Sudan High
Ghana High St. Lucia  3/ 4/ Moderate
Grenada  3/ In debt distress St. Vincent and the Grenadines  3/ High
Guinea Moderate Sudan In debt distress
Guinea-Bissau Moderate Tajikistan High
Guyana Moderate Tanzania Low
Haiti High Timor Leste 3/ Low
Honduras Low Togo Moderate
Kenya  High Tonga High
Kiribati High Tuvalu High
Kyrgyz Republic Moderate Uganda Low
Lao P.D.R. High Uzbekistan  3/ Low
Lesotho Moderate Vanuatu Moderate
Liberia Moderate Yemen, Republic of Moderate
Madagascar Low Zambia  High
Malawi Moderate Zimbabwe  3/ In debt distress
*/ While there is no binding minimum concessionality requirement in the absence of a Fund-supported program, concessional flows remain  the most 
appropriate source of external finance for LICs, highlighting the need for continued efforts by the international  community  to improve the availability and 1/ As of January 31, 2021 and based on the most recently published data, 7 countries are in debt distress, 28 countries are at high risk, 23 countries are at 
moderate risk, and 11 countries are at low risk of debt distress.2/  May reflect usual lags in the publication. Includes DSAs presented to the Executive Board on lapse of time basis.
3/ PRGT-eligible IDA-blend countries.
4/ A market-access countries (MACs) DSA has been completed and published within the past 24 months.
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Table 13. List of DSSI Eligible Countries 
 
 






















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Table 14. List of IDA Eligible Countries 
 
 
Source: World Bank n.d. 
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Table 15. Debt Owed to China, % of Borrower Country GDP 
 
Source: Horn, Reinhart, and Trebesch 2019. 

























































Table 16. Debt Owed to China, US$ Billion 
 
Source: Horn, Reinhart, and Trebesch 2019. 

























































Table 17. Paris Club Membership 
 
Source: Club de Paris n.d. 
Table 18. G20 Membership 
 
 
Source: G20 n.d. 
 
 























Variance Tests for Paris Club vs. Non-Paris Club Treatment, Various Indicators 
 
Table 19. Means and Variance Test for GDP Growth, PC and Non-PC Treatment, 
T0 to T3 
 
 
Table 20. Means and Variance Test for Debt to GDP, PC and Non-PC Treatment, 
T0 to T3 
 
 
Two-sample t test with equal variances 
  NonPC Obs  PC Obs NonPC Mean PC  Mean   dif   St Err   t value   p value
 outcome by treatment 1108 308 0.034 0.047 -0.014 0.004 -3.2 0.002
Variance ratio test
Group  Obs  Mean  Std.Err.  Std.Dev.  [95%Conf.  Interval]
NonPC 1,108 0.034 0.002 0.07 0.029 0.038
PC 308 0.047 0.003 0.049 0.042 0.053
combined 1,416 0.037 0.002 0.066 0.033 0.04
ratio = sd(NonPC) / sd(PC)                                    f =   2.0172
Ho: ratio = 1                                   degrees of freedom = 1107, 307
Ha: ratio < 1               Ha: ratio != 1                 Ha: ratio > 1
Pr(F < f) = 1.0000         2*Pr(F > f) = 0.0000           Pr(F > f) = 0.0000
Two-sample t test with unequal variances 
  NonPC Obs  PC Obs NonPC Mean PC  Mean   dif   St Err   t value   p value
 outcome by treatment 1108 308 0.034 0.047 -0.014 0.004 -3.2 0.002
Two-sample t test with equal variances 
  NonPC Obs  PC Obs NonPC Mean PC  Mean   dif   St Err   t value   p value
 outcome by treatment 851 347 57.005 68.67 -11.665 2.783 -4.200 0.000
 
Variance ratio test
Group  Obs  Mean  Std.Err.  Std.Dev.  [95%Conf.  Interval]
NonPC 851 57.005 1.47 42.891 54.12 59.891
PC 347 68.67 2.446 45.569 63.858 73.481
combined 1,198 60.384 1.271 43.984 57.891 62.877
ratio = sd(NonPC) / sd(PC)                                    f =   0.8859
Ho: ratio = 1                                    degrees of freedom = 850, 346
Ha: ratio < 1               Ha: ratio != 1                 Ha: ratio > 1
Pr(F < f) = 0.0859         2*Pr(F < f) = 0.1718           Pr(F > f) = 0.9141
Two-sample t test with unequal variances 
  NonPC Obs  PC Obs NonPC Mean PC  Mean   dif   St Err   t value   p value
 outcome by treatment 851 347 57.005 68.67 -11.665 2.783 -4.200 0.000
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Table 21. Means and Variance Test for Debt to GDP (% Change), PC and Non-PC 
Treatment, T0 to T3 
 
 
Table 22. Means and Variance Test for External Debt Service, % GDP, PC and 
Non-PC Treatment, T0 to T3 
 
Two-sample t test with equal variances 
NonPC Obs  PC Obs NonPC Mean PC  Mean   dif   St Err   t value   p value
 outcome by treatment 626 255 0.436 -6.318 6.753 1.125 6.000 0.000
Variance ratio test
Group  Obs  Mean  Std.Err.  Std.Dev.  [95%Conf.  Interval]
NonPC 626 0.435 0.518 12.95 -0.581 1.452
PC 255 -6.318 1.224 19.538 -8.728 -3.908
combined 881 -1.519 0.521 15.449 -2.541 -0.498
ratio = sd(NonPC) / sd(PC)                                    f =   0.4393
Ho: ratio = 1                                    degrees of freedom = 625, 254
Ha: ratio < 1               Ha: ratio != 1                 Ha: ratio > 1
Pr(F < f) = 0.0000         2*Pr(F < f) = 0.0000           Pr(F > f) = 1.0000
Two-sample t test with unequal variances 
NonPC Obs  PC Obs NonPC Mean PC  Mean   dif   St Err   t value   p value
 outcome by treatment 626 255 0.436 -6.318 6.753 1.125 6.000 0.000
Two-sample t test with equal variances 
  NonPC Obs  PC Obs NonPC Mean PC  Mean   dif   St Err   t value   p value
 outcome by treatment 902 435 0.022 0.019 0.002 0.002 1.55 0.118
 
Variance ratio test
 Group  Obs  Mean  Std.Err.  Std.Dev.  [95%Conf.  Interval]
NonPC 902 0.021 0.001 0.026 0.02 0.023
PC 435 0.019 0.001 0.021 0.017 0.021
combined 1,337 0.021 0.001 0.024 0.019 0.022
ratio = sd(NonPC) / sd(PC)                                    f =   1.6043
Ho: ratio = 1                                    degrees of freedom = 901, 434
Ha: ratio < 1               Ha: ratio != 1                 Ha: ratio > 1
Pr(F < f) = 1.0000         2*Pr(F > f) = 0.0000           Pr(F > f) = 0.0000
Two-sample t test with unequal variances 
  NonPC Obs  PC Obs NonPC Mean PC  Mean   dif   St Err   t value   p value
 outcome by treatment 902 435 0.022 0.019 0.002 0.002 1.55 0.118
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Table 23. Means and Variance Test for Change in External Debt Service, % GDP, 
PC and Non-PC Treatment, T0 to T3 
 
 
Table 24. Means and Variance Test for Current Account Balance, % GDP, PC 
and Non-PC Treatment, T0 to T3 
 
Two-sample t test with equal variances 
  NonPC Obs  PC Obs NonPC Mean PC  Mean   dif   St Err   t value   p value
 outcome by treatment 234 109 0.002 -0.005 0.007 0.003 2.65 0.008
 
Variance ratio test
 Group  Obs  Mean  Std.Err.  Std.Dev.  [95%Conf.  Interval]
NonPC 234 0.002 0.001 0.02 -0.001 0.004
PC 109 -0.005 0.002 0.023 -0.009 0
combined 343 0 0.001 0.021 -0.003 0.002
ratio = sd(NonPC) / sd(PC)                                    f =   0.7068
Ho: ratio = 1                                    degrees of freedom = 233, 108
Ha: ratio < 1               Ha: ratio != 1                 Ha: ratio > 1
Pr(F < f) = 0.0152         2*Pr(F < f) = 0.0304           Pr(F > f) = 0.9848
Two-sample t test with unequal variances 
  NonPC Obs  PC Obs NonPC Mean PC  Mean   dif   St Err   t value   p value
 outcome by treatment 234 109 0.002 -0.005 0.007 0.003 2.65 0.008
Two-sample t test with equal variances 
  NonPC Obs  PC Obs NonPC Mean PC  Mean   dif   St Err   t value   p value
 outcome by treatment 1030 456 -0.038 -0.045 0.007 0.006 1.2 0.234
 
Variance ratio test
 Group  Obs  Mean  Std.Err.  Std.Dev.  [95%Conf.  Interval]
NonPC 1,030 -0.038 0.003 0.096 -0.044 -0.032
PC 456 -0.045 0.006 0.121 -0.056 -0.034
combined 1,486 -0.04 0.003 0.104 -0.045 -0.035
ratio = sd(NonPC) / sd(PC)                                    f =   0.6397
Ho: ratio = 1                                   degrees of freedom = 1029, 455
Ha: ratio < 1               Ha: ratio != 1                 Ha: ratio > 1
Pr(F < f) = 0.0000         2*Pr(F < f) = 0.0000           Pr(F > f) = 1.0000
Two-sample t test with unequal variances 
  NonPC Obs  PC Obs NonPC Mean PC  Mean   dif   St Err   t value   p value
 outcome by treatment 1030 456 -0.038 -0.045 0.007 0.006 1.2 0.234
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Table 25. Means and Variance Test for Cumulative Current Account Balance, % 
GDP, PC and Non-PC Treatment, T0 to T3 
 
 
Table 26. Means and Variance Test for Change in Current Account Balance, % 
GDP, PC and Non-PC Treatment, T0 to T3 
 
 
Two-sample t test with equal variances 
  NonPC Obs  PC Obs NonPC Mean PC  Mean   dif   St Err   t value   p value
 outcome by treatment 261 114 -0.149 -0.179 0.03 0.037 0.8 0.425
 
Variance ratio test
 Group  Obs  Mean  Std.Err.  Std.Dev.  [95%Conf.  Interval]
NonPC 261 -0.15 0.02 0.317 -0.188 -0.111
PC 114 -0.18 0.035 0.374 -0.249 -0.11
combined 375 -0.159 0.017 0.335 -0.193 -0.125
ratio = sd(NonPC) / sd(PC)                                    f =   0.7176
Ho: ratio = 1                                    degrees of freedom = 260, 113
Ha: ratio < 1               Ha: ratio != 1                 Ha: ratio > 1
Pr(F < f) = 0.0161         2*Pr(F < f) = 0.0321           Pr(F > f) = 0.9839
Two-sample t test with unequal variances 
  NonPC Obs  PC Obs NonPC Mean PC  Mean   dif   St Err   t value   p value
 outcome by treatment 261 114 -0.149 -0.179 0.03 0.037 0.8 0.425
Two-sample t test with equal variances 
  NonPC Obs  PC Obs NonPC Mean PC  Mean   dif   St Err   t value   p value
 outcome by treatment 259 114 0.002 -0.009 0.011 0.013 0.85 0.396
 
Variance ratio test
 Group  Obs  Mean  Std.Err.  Std.Dev.  [95%Conf.  Interval]
NonPC 259 0.001 0.007 0.112 -0.012 0.015
PC 114 -0.009 0.011 0.112 -0.03 0.011
combined 373 -0.002 0.006 0.112 -0.013 0.009
ratio = sd(NonPC) / sd(PC)                                    f =   0.9992
Ho: ratio = 1                                    degrees of freedom = 258, 113
Ha: ratio < 1               Ha: ratio != 1                 Ha: ratio > 1
Pr(F < f) = 0.4896         2*Pr(F < f) = 0.9792           Pr(F > f) = 0.5104
Two-sample t test with unequal variances 
  NonPC Obs  PC Obs NonPC Mean PC  Mean   dif   St Err   t value   p value
 outcome by treatment 259 114 0.002 -0.009 0.011 0.013 0.85 0.396
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Table 27. Means and Variance Test for Primary Fiscal Balance, % GDP, PC and 
Non-PC Treatment, T0 to T3 
 
 
Table 28. Means and Variance Test for Cumulative Primary Fiscal Balance, % 
GDP, PC and Non-PC Treatment, T0 to T3 
 
Two-sample t test with equal variances 
  NonPC Obs  PC Obs NonPC Mean PC  Mean   dif   St Err   t value   p value
 outcome by treatment 911 396 -0.009 -0.029 0.02 0.014 1.45 0.144
 
Variance ratio test
 Group  Obs  Mean  Std.Err.  Std.Dev.  [95%Conf.  Interval]
NonPC 911 -0.01 0.002 0.051 -0.013 -0.006
PC 396 -0.029 0.02 0.394 -0.068 0.01
combined 1,307 -0.016 0.006 0.221 -0.028 -0.004
ratio = sd(NonPC) / sd(PC)                                    f =   0.0167
Ho: ratio = 1                                    degrees of freedom = 910, 395
Ha: ratio < 1               Ha: ratio != 1                 Ha: ratio > 1
Pr(F < f) = 0.0000         2*Pr(F < f) = 0.0000           Pr(F > f) = 1.0000
Two-sample t test with unequal variances 
  NonPC Obs  PC Obs NonPC Mean PC  Mean   dif   St Err   t value   p value
 outcome by treatment 911 396 -0.009 -0.029 0.02 0.014 1.45 0.144
Two-sample t test with equal variances 
  NonPC Obs  PC Obs NonPC Mean PC  Mean   dif   St Err   t value   p value
 outcome by treatment 241 102 -0.036 -0.113 0.076 0.089 0.85 0.393
 
Variance ratio test
 Group  Obs  Mean  Std.Err.  Std.Dev.  [95%Conf.  Interval]
NonPC 241 -0.037 0.011 0.167 -0.058 -0.016
PC 102 -0.113 0.135 1.366 -0.381 0.155
combined 343 -0.059 0.041 0.756 -0.14 0.021
ratio = sd(NonPC) / sd(PC)                                    f =   0.0149
Ho: ratio = 1                                    degrees of freedom = 240, 101
Ha: ratio < 1               Ha: ratio != 1                 Ha: ratio > 1
Pr(F < f) = 0.0000         2*Pr(F < f) = 0.0000           Pr(F > f) = 1.0000
Two-sample t test with unequal variances 
  NonPC Obs  PC Obs NonPC Mean PC  Mean   dif   St Err   t value   p value
 outcome by treatment 241 102 -0.036 -0.113 0.076 0.089 0.85 0.393
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Table 29. Means and Variance Test for Change in Primary Fiscal Balance, % 














Two-sample t test with equal variances 
  NonPC Obs  PC Obs NonPC Mean PC  Mean   dif   St Err   t value   p value
 outcome by treatment 241 102 0.001 -0.005 0.006 0.007 0.95 0.337
 
Variance ratio test
 Group  Obs  Mean  Std.Err.  Std.Dev.  [95%Conf.  Interval]
NonPC 241 0 0.004 0.055 -0.007 0.007
PC 102 -0.006 0.005 0.054 -0.016 0.005
combined 343 -0.001 0.003 0.055 -0.007 0.004
ratio = sd(NonPC) / sd(PC)                                    f =   1.0580
Ho: ratio = 1                                    degrees of freedom = 240, 101
Ha: ratio < 1               Ha: ratio != 1                 Ha: ratio > 1
Pr(F < f) = 0.6222         2*Pr(F > f) = 0.7555           Pr(F > f) = 0.3778
Two-sample t test with unequal variances 
  NonPC Obs  PC Obs NonPC Mean PC  Mean   dif   St Err   t value   p value
 outcome by treatment 241 102 0.001 -0.005 0.006 0.007 0.95 0.337
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Figure 43. Incidence of Serial Default/Distress 
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